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Feminist Legal Epistemology
Susan H. Williamst
Feminist legal theory, having achieved a degree of recognition (if
not acceptance) in the legal academy, has become increasingly introspec-
tive. One form of this self-scrutiny is the growing attention to the ways
in which feminist theory has focused on white, middle-class, heterosexual
women to the exclusion of others. A related form is the turn towards
epistemology.
Feminists from many fields have begun to examine with a critical
eye their own assumptions about the nature of human knowledge and the
social role that knowledge claims play. This examination grows out of a
feminist critique of mainstream epistemology and of the science, ethics,
and politics that rest on that epistemology. At the heart of this critique is
an insight central to postmodern theory: the social construction of
knowledge and its consequent context-dependence.
Social constructionism carries great promise, both for the critical
project of deconstructing mainstream Cartesian epistemology and for the
reconstructive project of designing an epistemological foundation for a
more inclusive feminist theory. At the same time, however, this
postmodern turn in feminist theory poses a serious threat to some of the
deepest commitments of feminism, including the basic commitment to
recognizing and working to eliminate the oppression of women. Several
feminist theorists have attempted to appropriate the useful aspects of
social constructionism within the framework of a theory that would neu-
tralize its corrosive threat. While many of these attempts are promising,
none has yet adequately described an alternative vision on which a new
epistemology could be founded. As a result, the feminist frameworks
t Associate Professor, Cornell Law School; Visiting Professor, Indiana University School of
Law; J.D., B.A. Harvard University. I would like to thank the following people for their
generous comments and advice: Kathryn Abrams, Alison Baldwin, Kevin Brown, Donald
Gjerdingen, Lynne Henderson, Steven Heyman, Robin West, and, as always, David Williams.
1 This insight has important implications for three interlocking sets of issues facing feminist
theory: epistemological issues, normative issues, and identity issues. I will refer to both the
normative and identity concerns, but I will do so through the lens of epistemology. An
equally valuable account could be written by focusing primarily on either of the other two
issues.
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appear to rest, by default, on a "Cartesian echo" that undermines their
purpose.
This Article will begin by describing the usefulness of social con-
structionism to the feminist critique of mainstream epistemology and to
the creation of a more inclusive feminism. I will then explain why and
how this new epistemology poses a threat to feminist commitments.
Finally, I will consider several attempts by feminist theorists to "tame"
social constructionism. I believe that important epistemological work
remains to be done, and I will try to describe the nature and goal of that
work. The possibility of a meaningful alternative epistemology depends
upon our ability to explain how standards for judgment can be both
socially constructed and sufficient to deal with cultural conflict. Feminist
theorists are right in arguing that we must give up our desire for determi-
nate answers to issues of social design, but we can and must be able to
say more about what sorts of considerations count in the conversation
through which our culture-legal and otherwise-is created.
I. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM AND A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF
CARTESIANISM
A. Cartesianism
Since the Enlightenment, epistemology, both in and outside of law,
has been developing along lines consistent enough to be considered a
mainstream tradition. Indeed, this traditional epistemological stance has
come to be so widely accepted and so much a part of many of our social
institutions that it is almost invisible to us. This mainstream tradition is
Cartesianism. 2
Cartesian epistemology presents a picture of the world in which an
external and objective reality is available to individual knowers through
the use of their reason, sometimes combined with their sense perception.
The knowledge attained is universally true, rather than true merely for a
particular person in a particular time and place.3 This view gives rise to
a series of dichotomies that have formed a mainstay of philosophical
speculation and have had a dramatic influence on our cultural imagina-
tion. The cumulative effect of the Cartesian vision and its associated
dichotomies is a model of knowledge in which to know something is to
exercise power over it, to dominate or control it.
Feminist philosophers Alison Jagger and Susan Bordo have com-
2 Cartesianism may be best understood as a family of theories rather than as a single theory.
There are many issues either unresolved or contested within the range of Cartesian theories.
My point is not that epistemology has been totally unified, but that the many disagreements
that exist have been fought out largely within the assumptions of Cartesianism rather than as
challenges to those assumptions.
3 For a concise description of this epistemological position, see CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON,
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 97 (1989).
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piled a useful list of the assumptions that make up the Cartesian model.4
The first assumption associated with Cartesianism is that reality has an
objective nature, that is, a nature independent of human understandings
of it. In other words, reality is simply "out there" and its character is
unaffected by whether we recognize or understand it.
Second, Cartesianism holds that this objective reality is, at least in
principle, accessible to human knowledge. This position, when combined
with the first assumption gives rise to the dominant theory about the
nature of truth in Western philosophy and culture: the correspondence
theory of truth. The correspondence theory holds that a proposition is
true if, and only if, it accurately describes the nature of objective reality.5
Since one of the generally recognized conditions for knowledge is that its
content must be true,6 this theory of truth requires that knowledge can
concern only that objective reality which exists independent of human
understanding.
Third, Cartesianism assumes that people approach the task of gain-
ing knowledge individually rather than as socially constituted members
of particular groups. In the form most relevant to this argument, this
"epistemological individualism" means that the tools or characteristics
necessary for the pursuit of knowledge exist in individual human beings
considered independently of the particular social context in which they
may exist. For example, people's exercise of their sensory organs argua-
bly can be understood without reference to their particular social con-
text, while their aesthetic sense arguably cannot. As a result, sense data
would qualify as facts to be known, while aesthetic judgments are seen as
matters of taste rather than as matters of knowledge.
Fourth, Cartesianism exhibits a "rationalist bias." That is, it
assumes that the primary faculty through which human beings gain
knowledge is their reason.7 In some types of Cartesianism, this faculty is
strongly supplemented by the use of the senses, while in other types rea-
4 The following description closely follows their account. See ALISON M. JAGGER & SUSAN R.
BORDO, Introduction in GENDER/BODY/KNOWLEDGE: FEMINIST RECONSTRUCTIONS OF
BEING AND KNOWING 1, 3 (1989) [Hereinafter GENDER/BODY/KNOWLEDGE]. For a simi-
lar listing, see Jane Flax, Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory, in FEMI-
NISM/POSTMODERNISM 39, 41-42 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990).
5 See BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 126-30 (1912); Kenneth J.
Gergen, Feminist Critique of Science and the Challenge of Social Epistemology, in FEMINIST
THOUGHT AND THE STRUCTURE OF KNOWLEDGE 27, 28 (Mary M. Gergen ed., 1988). See
generally RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979) (describing
the development of this representational model of knowledge and criticizing it).
6 E.g., KEITH LEHRER, THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 9 (1990).
7 Some feminists have seen this rationalist bias as tied to the division of manual and mental
labor, and the preference for mental labor, that gives rise to a hierarchical structure in capital-
ist systems of production. See Hilary Rose, Beyond Masculinist Realities: A Feminist Episte-
mology for the Sciences, in FEMINIST APPROACHES TO SCIENCE 57, 69 (Ruth Bleier ed., 1986).
For interesting discussions of how the rationalist bias affects law, see Lynne N. Hender-
son, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987) (judicial interpretation); Robin
West, Love, Rage, and Legal Theory, I YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 101 (1989) (lawyering and
legal theory).
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son is held to be quite efficacious on its own.' But even where sense data
are considered necessary additions, reason is the faculty used to assess
that data and to acquire knowledge from it.
Finally, the knowledge attained through the proper exercise of these
faculties is true for all people. "Differences in the situations of human
beings, rather than being recognized as providing alternative perspectives
on reality, are seen as conquerable impediments to a neutral, 'objective'
view of things."9 There cannot be competing truths; on any given issue
there is only one truth. All other perspectives are more or less false due
to a greater or lesser degree of failure properly to exercise the capacities
for reasoning or gathering sense data. This assumption is described as a
requirement of universalism or of neutrality.'o
These Cartesian assumptions are closely associated with a series of
dichotomies that permeate not only the philosophical tradition but also
popular culture. The dichotomies include mind/body, culture/nature,
universal/particular, reason/emotion, and objective/subjective. It is not
difficult to see how the Cartesian assumptions are connected to these
dichotomies. The rationalist bias obviously places a premium on distin-
guishing reason from other faculties, like emotion. Similarly, the belief
in an external reality independent of human understanding and in the
need for knowledge to be universal and neutral leads naturally to the
dichotomies between objective and subjective beliefs or perspectives and
between universality and particularity. The mind/body dichotomy is
explained by the belief that knowledge, because it is pursued through
reason, is an attribute of the mind rather than of the body. The body, on
the other hand, is the site of all the innumerable particularities that mire
us in emotion and subjectivity.
Finally, the culture/nature dichotomy often functions as a summa-
tion of all the previous dichotomies. Nature represents all that is physi-
cal, moved by emotion or instinct rather than by reason, sunk in
subjectivity and particularity. Culture is the triumph of mind and rea-
son, imposing objective and universal constraints (perhaps most clearly,
although not exclusively, in the form of law) over these forces of chaos,
8 Empiricism is perhaps the most common and influential version of Cartesianism. Empiricism
maintains that all knowledge is derived from experience. See RUSSELL, supra note 5, at 73.
Empiricists use statements about appearances or sense perceptions as the basic tools out of
which reason can build knowledge. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING (1964); CLARENCE I. LEWIS, AN ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE AND VALU-
ATION (1946). Rationalists, like Descartes himself, on the other hand, place more reliance on
reason acting independent of sense perception as a mechanism for acquiring knowledge. RENft
DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD OF RIGHTLY CONDUCTING THE REASON, AND
SEEKING TRUTH IN THE SCIENCES, Part IV 62-63 (Anchor Books ed., 1974) (1637). Carte-
sianism, as I define it, is broad enough to encompass both varieties of theory. Cf Dennis
Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 254, 266 (1992) (rationalism
and empiricism are both foundationalist).
9 JAGGER & BORDO, supra note 4, at 3.
10 See LEHRER, supra note 6, at 15.
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danger, and ignorance. Nature may be the non-human physical world-
the resources and raw materials, along with the plagues and natural
disasters-against and over which man stands as the representative of
culture. But nature may also be people-the "barbarian" hordes of
another nation, the subset of our own population in need of control (e.g.
women, the poor, minorities), or even the part of each individual that
sometimes threatens to overwhelm his reason. In other words, the
nature/culture distinction does not, as it might first appear, mark the
boundary between human beings and the rest of existence. It constructs,
instead, the boundary between the orderly and productive realm in which
reason and objectivity rule and the confused, inarticulate, and possibly
dangerous area beyond the wall, which has yet to be subdued. Human
beings can, and do, live on both sides of that wall.
These dichotomies, then, spell out with greater specificity some of
the implications of the Cartesian assumptions. They point to the values
enshrined by that view of knowledge and to the dangers or failures to be
avoided." One important result of these assumptions and dichotomies is
the connection forged in Cartesianism between knowledge and power.
There are at least two ways in which the process of acquiring knowl-
edge is related to control or power. 2 The first (and often unrecognized)
connection is that control is a necessary aspect of the knower's relation to
himself. The activity of gathering knowledge requires the knower to
exercise control over those parts of himself and his environment which
might interfere with his access to an objective reality. He must restrain
his emotions, so that they do not cloud his reason, and he must reduce
his particularities-as a judge, for example, assumes an institutional role
that distances him from personal experiences that might affect his view of
the issue before him-so that he can reach a more neutral or universally
valid answer.
The second sense in which Cartesianism links knowledge and con-
trol concerns the relationship between the knower and the known: the
knower exercises power or control over the known. The external world,
the things to be known, are constructed on an analogy to the part of the
self to be subdued. Those things are conceived as passive, not in the
sense of being inactive, but in the sense of being reactive rather than self-
initiating. They are, therefore, subject to prediction and often to manipu-
lation. Reason, which is the key to autonomy and freedom from deter-
minist particularity, is available to the knower but not to the known.
Perhaps the impact of the Cartesian assumptions and dichotomies
1 Because of their extremely deep and pervasive role in Western culture, the dichotomies also
illuminate how extensively Cartesian assumptions have broken the bounds of professional phi-
losophy and have permeated popular ideas.
12 See Anna Yeatman, A Feminist Theory of Social Differentiation, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERN-
ISM, supra note 4, at 281, 288.
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can be summarized by saying that they posit the thing known as an
object, rather than a subject in its own right.' 3 This result frees the
knower to exercise power or control over the thing known for his own
ends rather than considering and respecting its ends or establishing a
community of shared ends, as one would hope he would feel required to
do with another subject. Since other people can be among the things
known, it is possible of course that a person could act as the object of
knowledge at one time and as a knower herself at another time. It is even
possible that she could act as knower and known simultaneously. What
is not possible is that she should be seen by her knower as standing in a
relationship in which knowledge, and therefore power, flows in both
directions. That is, to the extent that someone or something is the object
of knowledge, she/it must be treated as an object.
Cartesianism, in short, is a system of epistemological assumptions
that gives rise to dichotomies and supports a model of knowledge as
power. It generates a distant and hierarchical relationship between the
knower and the known and promises knowledge with a high degree of
certainty and generality. In exchange, it exacts from the knower a sense
of deep fragmentation both in himself and in the world more generally.
It is this epistemological tradition that feminists, among others, have
challenged.
B. The Critique
The social constructionist argument asserts that the creation of
knowledge is an activity that takes place only within, and is deeply
shaped by, a cultural context.' 4 This emphasis on the particular cultural
context is a direct denial of the Cartesian assumption of individualism. It
carries implications, however, that threaten every other assumption of
Cartesianism as well.
There are at least three senses in which the process of acquiring
knowledge is shaped by cultural (and also personal) context. First, the
very facts that are taken by Cartesianism to be the materials out of which
reason constructs knowledge are shaped by culture. "One thing is clear:
making facts is a social enterprise."' 5 Our experience does not come to
us in prearranged bundles; rather, facts are made by a process of selec-
tion from experience. What we notice and how we organize our experi-
ence are both constrained by the conceptual categories that our culture
13 See Seyla Benhabib, Epistemologies of Postmodernism: A Rejoinder to Jean-Francois Lyotard,
in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM, supra note 4, at 107, 110-11.
14 See generally, PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMAN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
REALITY (1966).
15 Ruth Hubbard, Some Thoughts About the Masculinity of the Natural Sciences, in FEMINIST
THOUGHT AND THE STRUCTURE OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 5, at 1.
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makes available to us. 6 Moreover, this process of acculturation need not
be identical for every member of a culture. A society may give different
conceptual tools to different groups; for example, women may be taught
to notice and identify subtle changes in emotional states while men are
not. In addition, the more particular context surrounding an individ-
ual-family, neighborhood, religious association, ethnic group, etc.-
may add to or alter the cultural impact of the larger society on that indi-
vidual's way of knowing. Each person has a potentially unique collection
of conceptual categories available for understanding his or her
experience. 7
This first sense in which knowledge is culturally constructed-the
argument that there are no "brute facts" to which human beings have
access independent of their culturally contingent conceptual catego-
ries a-grows out of the denial of epistemological individualism but also
raises serious difficulties for objectivism and the correspondence theory
of truth. Even if some reality existed that was independent of human
understandings of it, people would not have access to it. The kind of
unfiltered, direct knowledge promised by objectivism is simply not avail-
able to human beings.
The second sense in which knowledge is socially constructed is that
in order to define data and to analyze them, interpreters must make value
choices. Experience always underdetermines the "data" that it is used to
construct and data underdetermine the theories that they are used to
construct. To choose between the alternative interpretations that could
be used to explain experience or data, one must rely-explicitly or
implicitly-on a value judgment. In traditional science, some value judg-
16 See Naomi Scheman, Individualism and the Objects of Psychology, in DISCOVERING REALITY:
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON EPISTEMOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS 225, 299 (Sandra Harding
and Merrill B. Hintikka eds., 1983). Moreover, the orienting assumptions or cultural catego-
ries that we use to organize our experience are largely, if not totally, immune to challenge by
the data or facts that result. "[O]nce an investigator has adopted a given ontology, this system
of orientation determines what is counted as an event; data cannot correct or falsify the ontol-
ogy because all data collected within the perspective can be understood only in its terms."
Gergen, supra note 5, at 29.
17 The Cartesian method attempts to correct for this particularity by insisting on the replicability
of results. That is, someone else must be able to repeat the experiment and achieve the same
results in order for them to be considered reliable. This process may correct for some of the
more individualized factors that affect perception and recognition-e.g., a particular
researcher's blindness to certain concerns-but it does nothing to correct for very widely
shared blindnesses caused by deeply held cultural assumptions or conceptual categories. SAN-
DRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE? 143-46 (1991); Alison Jagger, Love
and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology, in GENDER/BODY/KNOWLEDGE, supra
note 4, at 145, 156. It would, at least in theory, be possible to correct for all such cultural
frameworks by finding that the results can be replicated by people within every culture in the
world (without teaching them our cultural categories). Simply suggesting such a thing makes
it plain, however, how hopeless such a task would be. The impossibility of disproof, while not
itself a proof, nonetheless reinforces the claim that there is no knowledge outside of a concep-
tual framework and that conceptual frameworks are, at a minimum, strongly and pervasively
influenced by culture.
18 Mary M. Gergen, Toward a Feminist Metatheory and Methodology in the Social Sciences, in
FEMINIST THOUGHT AND THE STRUCTURE OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 5, at 87, 92.
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ments are explicitly acknowledged. For example, when choosing
between two theories, both of which could explain the available data,
scientists will prefer the theory that is simpler and more elegant. This is
by no means an inevitable choice: one could choose instead (or in addi-
tion) to favor the theory that was most general (or most specific), most
likely to produce human control over the phenomena at issue (or most
likely to produce human respect for those phenomena). Some of the
value choices at work in science are, however, less explicit and even more
problematic. For instance, scientists long explained the "data" about dif-
ferences between women's and men's analytical abilities by theorizing
about biological differences between the sexes. Other kinds of explana-
tions, which are now preferred by many scientists' 9 (such as socializa-
tion), were ignored because the political and moral values of patriarchy
were better served by biological explanations.
Finally, value judgments affect not only the interpretation of facts
and the construction or recognition of facts, but also the choice of which
issues or questions are worthy of investigation. There is no such thing as
a problem in need of study without people who have the problem: "[A]
problem is always a problem for someone."' 20 Which problems are stud-
ied will depend on whose perspective, concerns, and needs are considered
most important by society.
The value judgments inherent in these epistemological choices have
important moral and political implications.2 Different value choices
may have a significant impact on the social or political status of various
groups of people, on the rights and responsibilities that society is under-
stood to owe its members, and on the social institutions and mechanisms
that are seen as most appropriate or effective for promoting those rights
and responsibilities. Because of these moral and political implications,
the social constructionist critique argues that these value choices are sub-
ject to moral and political criticism and justification. The problems one
chooses to investigate, the way one describes the relevant data, and the
interpretations one places on those data can all be criticized on the
grounds that they are shaped by value choices that are morally or politi-
cally objectionable. Science, in other words, cannot be separated from
morality and politics. It is, instead, always permeated by them. The
refusal to recognize that connection does not lead to the elimination of
19 For a thorough assessment of research on cognitive and psychological differences between the
sexes, see generally RUTH BLEIER, SCIENCE AND GENDER: A CRITIQUE OF BIOLOGY AND
ITS THEORIES ON WOMEN (1984). For a shortened version, see Ruth Bleier, Sex Differences
Research: Science or Belief?, in FEMINIST APPROACHES TO SCIENCE 147 (Ruth Bleier ed.,
1986).
20 Sandra Harding, Introduction: Is There a Feminist Method?, in FEMINISM AND METHODOL-
OGY 1, 6 (Sandra Harding ed., 1987).
21 For an application of this critique that discusses such implications, see Martha Chamallas,
Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual and Racial Harassment
Litigation, I TEXAS J. WOMEN & L. 95, 113-17 (1992).
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politics and morals from science, but to the immunization of the existing
political and moral value choices from criticism.
The interrelation of science, on the one hand, and morality and poli-
tics, on the other, strikes a blow at yet another aspect of Cartesianism:
its rationalist bias. Reason was distinguished precisely by its distance
from emotions and values, and the objectivity and universality which
that distance made possible.
Epistemology was often equated with the philosophy of science, and the
dominant methodology of positivism prescribed that truly scientific knowl-
edge must be capable of intersubjective verification. Because values and
emotions had been defined as variable and idiosyncratic, positivism stipu-
lated that trustworthy knowledge could be established only by methods
that neutralized the values and emotions of individual scientists.22
The social constructionist critique argues, however, that it is never
possible to neutralize emotions and values since they are an integral part
of interpretation and interpretation is an inescapable aspect of defining a
problem, describing the relevant facts, and theorizing about those facts.
Thus, reason, understood in some instrumental and non-substantive
way, 23 is simply insufficient (with or without the addition of sense per-
ception) as a foundation for knowledge. Emotion and value-with all
their subjectivity and particularity and cultural contingency-are also
necessary.
The denial of individualism, objectivism, and rationalism leads
directly to the denial of universalism as well. If our ability to theorize
and even our ability to perceive are so thoroughly dependent on the emo-
tions, values, and cultural conditioning that vary dramatically from one
person to another, then it is foolish to think that we can find answers, or
even define questions, that are universal or neutral across people. Such
neutrality is unattainable-certainly unattainable in every case, perhaps
unattainable in any case. As a result, we may be left with not one, but
many equally valid interpretations of reality. Perspectives or points of
view must be recognized as potentially valid alternatives, rather than as
barriers or failures to be overcome. 24 Knowledge may be personal or
22 Jagger, supra note 17, at 146; see also Jane Flax, Political Philosophy and the Patriarchal
Unconscious: A Psychoanalytic Perspective on Epistemology and Metaphysics, in DISCOVERING
REALITY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON EPISTEMOLOGY, METAPHYSICS, METHODOLOGY,
AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, supra note 16, at 248.
23 For an interesting account of the development of an instrumental, or "mathematical" concep-
tion of reason (and a discussion of the alternatives), see THOMAS A. SPRAGENS, JR., REASON
AND DEMOCRACY 14-56 (1990).
24 "There are and must be different experiences of the world and different bases of experience
.... We may not rewrite the other's world or impose upon it a conceptual framework which
extracts from it what fits with ours. Our conceptual procedures should be capable of explicat-
ing and analyzing the properties of their experienced world rather than administering it.
Their reality, their varieties of experience must be an unconditional datum." Dorothy E.
Smith, Women's Perspective as a Radical Critique of Sociology, in FEMINISM AND METHODOL-
OGY, 84, 93 (Sandra Harding ed., 1987).
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social; it is not necessarily universal.
This critique also holds important implications for the relationship
between the knower and the known. No longer is the relationship a dis-
tant one, in which knower and known are separated from each other by a
huge gulf of reason and objectivity and in which knowledge flows only in
one direction and in which the known is seen as an object to be manipu-
lated or controlled. Instead, there is no rigid separation of the knower
and the known. Obviously, such separation is not possible when the very
"facts" about the known are themselves permeated by the identity and
context of the knower. In addition, the known-whether it is another
human being or some non-human aspect of nature-is seen as active and
complex, rather than as passive and needing control.2 5 In other words,
the process of influence, and even of knowledge, runs in both directions.
Just as the known is defined by the characteristics of the knower, the
knower's very identity is altered by the process of coming to understand
the known. "The reconstruction of knowledge is inseparable from the
reconstruction of ourselves."
26
In sum, the social constructionist critique begins by arguing that
knowledge is a human, and therefore social, artifact, deeply shaped by
the particular social context in which it is created. The argument then
goes on to generate conclusions that contradict every premise of Carte-
sian epistemology. The vision of knowledge that emerges is one in which
the known and the knower are intimately connected, indeed mutually
defining, and exist only within a particular cultural context.2 7
C. The Sense in Which the Critique Is Feminist
As I have just described it, the social constructionist critique is in no
sense unique to feminism. Indeed, some critique along these lines is com-
mon to many different schools of thought.2 There is, however, a version
25 See Elizabeth Fee, Critiques of Modern Science.- The Relationship of Feminism to Other Radi-
cal Epistemologies, in FEMINIST APPROACHES TO SCIENCE, supra note 7, at 42, 47.
26 Jagger, supra note 17, at 145, 164. For example, feminist researchers in the social sciences
have adopted several techniques for allowing and encouraging the human subjects to influence
(and to learn from) the researcher, including inviting the subjects to contribute to the design of
the experiment or to the analysis of the results. See Gergen, supra note 18, at 94-101 (describ-
ing an experiment on women's attitudes toward menopsause); Maureen Cain, Realism, Femi-
nism, Methodology, and Law, 14 INT'L J. Soc.L. 255, 261-65 (1986) (describing when and how
to treat persons as "subjects" of study rather than as "objects").
27 For an argument that modern science has internalized this critique, but that legal theory still
partakes of the positivism of an earlier scientific tradition, see Jeanne L. Schroeder, Abduction
from the Seraglio: Feminist Methodologies and the Logic of Imagination, 70 TEx. L. REV.
109, 11, 128 n.44, 153 n.10 (1991).
28 The Cartesian model has been criticized by Marxists, by pragmatists, and by poststructuralists
and postmodernists. See Jagger & Bordo, supra note 4, at 1. It has also been attacked by
interpretivists and deconstructionists in literary theory, and by social constructionists and phe-
nomenologists in the social sciences. See Sondra Farganis, Feminism and the Reconstruction
of Social Science, in GENDER/BODY/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 4, at 207, 211; Kenneth J.
Gergen, supra note 5, at 27.
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of the critique that can properly be called feminist because it includes a
focus on the relationship between the Cartesian premises, on the one
hand, and gender and the oppression of women, on the other hand.29
The feminist argument is that Cartesian epistemology has been used as a
foundation for defining the difference between the genders30 and justify-
ing the oppression of women. 3'
The difference between the genders is constructed out of the dichot-
omies that form the popular representation of Cartesianism. This con-
nection between epistemology and gender, although initially puzzling,
seems less surprising when one recalls that sex is a traditional metaphor
for knowledge in Western culture; sexual union is the model for know-
ing. Who knows, how one knows, and what is known are all related to
gender.
The Cartesian knower is male. The characteristics associated with
the knower-objectivity, reason, universality, intellect-are associated
with men. 33 The thing known is female; the characteristics associated
with the object of knowledge-particularity, emotion, physicality-are
associated with women. Indeed, nature itself, as the quintessential object
of knowledge, is understood as feminine, and women are understood as
more closely connected to nature than men.34 Even the process of
29 See Jagger & Bordo, supra note 4, at 4.
30 "Gender" is used here, as it generally is in feminist literature, not to describe biological differ-
ences, but to describe the socially constructed identities of male and female. This is not to
deny that there are biological differences between the sexes, but it is to deny that those differ-
ences (in isolation from culture) determine, in any significant way, the highly detailed, com-
plex, and deeply significant gender identities that exist in our society. See Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method. and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8
SIGNS 635, 635 n.1 (1983). Indeed, the attempt to separate biology and culture may be futile
and misguided: they stand in a dialectical relationship in which each influences the other. See
DEBORAH RHODE, Introduction, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE
1, 4 (Deborah Rhode ed., 1990) ("For example, we cannot understand sex-based differentials
of height, weight, and physical strength without considering the influence of diet, dress, divi-
sion of labor, and so forth."); JEAN GRIMSHAW, PHILOSOPHY AND FEMINIST THINKING 130-
131 (1986); Sandra Harding, Is Gender a Variable in Conceptions of Rationality?, 36 DIALEC-
TICA 225, 226 n.1 (1982).
31 See MAcKINNON, supra note 3, at 128 ("A theory of sexuality becomes feminist methodologi-
cally ... to the extent it treats sexuality as a social construct of male power..."). Catharine
MacKinnon is one of the most forceful and longstanding proponents of this epistemological
critique. See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 30.
32 See EVELYN Fox KELLER, REFLECTIONS ON GENDER AND SCIENCE 18 (1985); see also Fee,
supra note 25, at 44:
[T]he language and metaphors of the scientific revolution were clear: sexuality was the
metaphor for the mediation between mind and nature. Mind was male, Nature was
female, and knowledge was created as an act of aggression-a passive nature had to be
interrogated, unclothed, penetrated and compelled by man to reveal her secrets.
33 See Fee, supra note 25, at 44 (values associated with men are the values and attributes of
scientists). Indeed, the Cartesian knower is a particular kind of man: white, middle or upper
class, probably heterosexual, and possibly from a very specific ethnic and religious back-
ground. In other words, Cartesianism has been used to support other social hierarchies
besides gender.
34 See Peggy Reeves Sanday, The Reproduction of Patriarchy in Feminist Anthropology, in FEMI-
NIST THOUGHT AND THE STRUCTURES OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 5, at 49, 53 (describing
an article in which a female anthropologist argues that the universal devaluation of women
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acquiring knowledge is male. The relation between knower and known is
one of separation, a relation of objectivity. Such separation is required
for the autonomy of the knowing subject. And masculinity is, of course,
defined importantly in terms of autonomy and separation." Femininity,
on the other hand is traditionally defined in terms of connection and
dependence, characteristics which make the acquisition of knowledge by
women perhaps impossible, certainly unfeminine. In other words, the
gender dichotomy-male/female-is parallel to, and defined in terms of,
the other dichotomies already discussed.
The Cartesian premises and dichotomies do not merely define men
and women as different, they also form the foundation for a justification
of oppression of women. As I discussed in the section describing Carte-
sianism, the feminine halves of the dichotomies are seen not only as dif-
ferent, but also as threatening. a6 This threat creates the motivation and
justification for the masculine half to control the feminine half and, cor-
respondingly, for men to control women.37
The feminist version of the social constructionist critique, then, goes
beyond the more general version by pointing out how a particular cul-
tural category-gender-both supports and is supported by the particu-
lar epistemological assumptions of Cartesianism. The feminist critique
does not simply argue that value judgments and social goals are generally
implicit in epistemological choices; it demonstrates how a particular set
of values and goals-those of gender distinction and gender domina-
tion-are implicit in a particular epistemology. It is this focus that dis-
tinguishes the feminist version from other varieties of social
constructivism.38
can be explained by the fact that women are seen as closer to nature than men, while men are
associated with culture).
35 See KELLER, supra note 32, at 79; Harding, supra note 30, at 238.
36 See supra notes 4-13 and accompanying text.
37 See Harding, supra note 30, at 238.
38 The strongest critic of this position is Joan Williams, who has forcefully argued that the episte-
mological critique is neither "feminist" nor "feminine". See Joan Williams, Deconstructing
Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 804, 806 (1989). Despite appearances to the contrary, I do
not think Williams would disagree with my argument in text; I believe that her criticisms are
aimed at a different contention. She is denying that the new, contextual epistemology is an
accurate model for women's traditional, or stereotypical ways of thinking. She believes that
the new epistemology is itself highly rational and detached, whereas the traditional view of
women is as too emotional for rational thought. To associate the stereotype of female thinking
with this new epistemology is, she argues, to "fail[ ] to come to terms with the extent to which
the gender stereotypes were designed to marginalize women" as hopelessly uncerebral. Id. at
805-06. She also points out that the contextuality critique has been developed primarily by
men. Id. at 806.
I am not sure that I agree with Joan Williams' description of the contextuality critique as
cerebral and detached, or with her dismissal of its connection to empirical work on women's
ways of thinking. But the point I am trying to make here is a different one altogether. I am
focusing on the negative aspects of the critique, rather than on the positive, alternative episte-
mology it implies. I am not arguing that the new epistemology matches the way women actu-
ally do, or are stereotypically seen to, think. Instead, I am simply pointing out that the
contextuality critique makes plain the connection between Cartesian epistemology-seen as a
contingent and socially constructed view of reality-and gender. I don't think that Joan Wil-
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Thus, the social constructionist argument forms the foundation of a
powerful feminist critique of the mainstream tradition in epistemology.
With the tools provided by social constructionism, feminists have uncov-
ered the deep connections between our culture's understanding of the
human relationship to reality, on the one hand, and our culture's com-
mitment to gender difference and gender oppression, on the other hand.
This critique has proven a fruitful starting place for an astonishingly
diverse array of arguments, ranging from assessments of the different
conceptions of self men and women develop in such a culture39 to an
examination of how power is integral to the construction of sexuality
itself.' The critique is far too powerful and productive to be easily
relinquished.
I. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM AND AN INCLUSIONARY FEMINISM
In addition to its usefulness in feminism's critical project, social con-
structionism also provides interesting possibilities for the constructive
project of building a more inclusive basis for feminist theory and prac-
tice. The problem in recent years has not been explicit exclusion,41
although history demonstrates that feminists are not immune to such
outright prejudice.42 The more modem manifestations of feminist exclu-
sion are, however, somewhat subtler if no less effective.43 Three of the
liams would disagree that the Cartesian dichotomies are linked to a dichotomous definition of
gender roles, or that the overwhelming bias for one side of those dichotomies helps to justify
the oppression of women. Indeed, her own characterization of the traditional female stereo-
type relies on these dichotomies. See id. at 804. Nor do I think Williams would deny that the
central insights of the critique-the social construction of knowledge, the role of moral and
political considerations in systems of knowledge, and the denial of universality of knowledge-
are useful tools for illuminating the connection between Cartesianism and gender oppression.
Indeed, Williams is one of the proponents of this approach, see infra part III.B. I believe, in
other words, that her criticism simply is not directed at this argument.
Williams' second point concerns authorship. While the contextuality critique in gen-
eral-and particularly the positive epistemological program it suggests-may be largely the
product of men, the branch specifically focused on gender has been overwhelmingly produced
by women. Williams' reference to male authorship is, therefore, further evidence that she is
not concerned with the same argument I am.
39 See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 2 (1982) ("[T]hese differences arise in a
social context where factors of social status and power combine with reproductive biology to
shape the experience of males and females ... [m]y interest lies in the interaction of experience
and thought."); SHEILA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING 13 (1989) (relying on a "practical-
ist"-nonuniversalist and nonfoundationalist--conception of truth to describe maternal
thinking).
40 See MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 96-98.
41 But see doris davenport, The Pathology of Racism: A Conversation with Third World Wimmin,
in THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR 85, 85
(Cherrie Moraga & Gloria Anzaldfia eds., 1983).
42 See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE, AND CLASS 70-86 (1981).
43 See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 197-205 (1989-1990) (discussing the inattention to lesbian experience in
various branches of feminist legal theory); see THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS
BY RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR supra note 41, at 63-106 (describing experiences of racism
within the women's movement).
BERKELEY WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
most common tactics are: essentialism, the construction of difference as
inherent rather than relational, and the failure to seek out (or the ten-
dency to ignore) the voices often muffled by layers of social oppression.
Social constructivism is an important antidote to the insidiously exclu-
sionary implications of these elements of feminist theory.
A. Essentialism
Angela Harris has defined gender essentialism as "the notion that a
unitary, 'essential' women's experience can be isolated and described
independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of
experience."'" Essentialism may be biologically based, asserting that
women share certain experiences and/or characteristics because of the
biological facts of sexuality and reproduction.45 It may also, however, be
culturally based, focusing on institutions and ideologies as the factors
that generate a specific set of experiences and characteristics shared by
women.46 Regardless of whether it looks to biology or culture, the essen-
tialist hope is to be able to make some assertions about women "as
women," without regard to other characteristics that may distinguish us
from each other.4
7
The appeal of essentialism is fairly obvious. First, it makes the pro-
cess of generating feminist arguments much easier. As Elizabeth Spel-
man puts it, "essentialism invites me to take what I understand to be true
of me 'as a woman' for some golden nugget of womanness that all women
have as women; and it makes the participation of other women inessen-
tial to the production of the story. How lovely: the many turn out to be
one, and the one that they are is me."48 Second, essentialism makes femi-
nism seem emotionally safe for those who get to define womanhood; fem-
inism becomes "a place of comfort, not conflict."49 Third, essentialism
seems to facilitate political movement by defining a broad-based com-
monality on which to organize.5 °
A social constructionist view, however, illuminates the way in which
essentialist theories exclude women who are not part of the white, mid-
44 Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585
(1990).
45 It is possible to read Robin West's work this way, see Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender,
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 20-27 (1988). Some older strands of radical feminism may also include
elements of biological essentialism. See generally MARY DALY, GYN/ECOLOGY (1978).
46 See generally NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (1978) (mothering
as an institution generates specific psychological differences between male and female chil-
dren); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987) (social structures of
dominance and the connection between sexuality and power shape women's experience).
47 ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN 165 (1988).
48 Id. at 159.
49 See Harris, supra note 44, at 606.
50 SPELMAN, supra note 47, at 15; Martha Minow & Elizabeth Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1597, 1622-23 (1990).
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die-class, heterosexual, able-bodied group that dominates theory-mak-
ing.5 t There are at least three ways in which this exclusion comes about.
First, the essential woman turns out in fact to have a very particular
social identity. When we abstract from the differences that might divide
us, we are left with a woman who belongs to those social groups that
experience themselves as the norm. Second, essentialism ignores the
interaction of different types of oppression. It demands that women
carve up into separate units what is experienced as an undivided whole.
And third, essentialism results in a practical, political focus on those
issues of most concern to one group of women. A social constructionist
approach helps to unmask each of these exclusionary effects.
1. Who is the essential woman?
An essentialist view of "woman" requires that we somehow isolate
''womanhood" from the other aspects of identity that every actual
woman also possesses. If race is something that divides us, then we must
imagine a woman without race; if class distinguishes some women from
others, then we must imagine a woman of no particular social class; and
so on for all other lines of division. The idea is to neutralize all other
variables so that we can focus on womanhood alone.
This method relies on a concept of race (for example) as a theoreti-
cally erasable characteristic of persons. One's race, like one's hair color,
is simply a fact, a piece of objective reality about which people can have
knowledge. Moreover, such characteristics can be abstracted away with-
out interfering with our ability to identify and find meaning in the person
remaining. It is, in other words, possible to imagine a person without
any particular race, simply by deleting that fact from their biography,
just as it would be possible to imagine someone with an unidentified hair
color.
On a social constructivist view, however, race is a social concept and
practice. Which differences count and what they mean is a matter of
culture, and in our culture race is not analogous to hair color. It is not
possible for a person to be a member of a culture deeply shaped by a
racial hierarchy and have no race. A person without race would no
longer be a part of the social world that we inhabit, the social world that
is the only source of meaning and knowledge.52 Race is an institution in
51 There are, of course, other sorts of problems with essentialism as well. See Williams, supra
note 38, at 813-21 (discussing the way in which Gilliganesque psychological essentialism can
be used against women); Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly Prized World: Myth, Allegory, and the
Feminine, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 644 (1990) (discussing the way in which essentialist theories
restrict women's ability to reinvent themselves).
52 Cf Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105
HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (1992) ("Because sex differences are semiotic-that is, constituted
by a system of signs that we produce and interpret-each of us inescapably produces herself
within the gender meaning system . . .").
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which all persons in our culture participate, albeit in very different ways,
so one cannot, even theoretically, be a person without a race.
The essentialist search for race-neutral "Woman" will, however,
often avoid this dead-end by accepting as its model the only people who
have the luxury of ignoring their own race in a society marked by racial
hierarchy: members of the dominant group." This is not to say that
they (we) are actually without race, as the project requires. We are
deeply shaped by our whiteness in a society that puts a premium on
white skin and our racial identity affects not only our relationships with
persons of other races but also our relationships with other members of
the dominant race.54 But because we experience ourselves as the norm
and all others as deviations from that norm, we are free to ignore the
impact of race on our identity. We have the privilege of experiencing
ourselves as raceless, an experience permanently denied to those who are
defined as different from the norm.5
In other words, to have a biography from which race is deleted is
not to be outside of the racial hierarchy at all, but rather to occupy a very
particular place in it. Thus, when essentialism searches for a woman
without race in a society marked by racial hierarchy, it will either fail
entirely or it will necessarily use as its model the woman of the dominant
race because she is the only one who can afford to be unconscious about
her racial identity.56 Social constructionism exposes the bias of such a
model by pointing out the impossibility of abstracting our way to the
essence of womanhood. We cannot eliminate the things that divide us
through abstraction.
2. The interaction of gender and other hierarchies
The essentialist project also rests on the assumption that gender is
fundamentally separate from other aspects of identity in a way that
would make isolation of womanness both possible and meaningful. This
assumption depends, in turn, on two views of the person undermined by
social constructionism. First, if one views gender, race, etc. as objective
aspects of the subject, then one can plausibly (if still not necessarily)
assume that each is theoretically distinct from the others. Just as hair
and eye color, height and weight, are all logically independent of each
other-so that we can alter one without necessarily affecting the others-
53 See Harris, supra note 44, at 604.
54 See SPELMAN, supra note 47, at 104-05.
55 See Cain, supra note 43, at 208 (describing self-identification of law students in which people
of color noted their race and lesbians noted their sexuality but straight, white students did
not).
56 The same is true for other differences between women: it is the middle class woman who can
ignore how she is shaped by class, the heterosexual woman who can ignore sexual orientation,
and the able-bodied woman who can ignore the issue of physical capacity.
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gender is seen as an independent variable. Second, a view of the self as
fundamentally separate from such characteristics, standing as the posses-
sor of them but not constituted by them, facilitates the assumption that
one can meaningfully talk about any given characteristic in isolation
from the others. After all, no characteristic permeates the self so deeply
that it cannot be abstracted away."7 This view of the self as possessor is,
in turn, supported by the Cartesian contention that a knower can and
must distance himself from the contingent characteristics that might
cloud his objectivity and that the only truly essential characteristic of the
knower is reason.
On a social constructivist view, however, gender and race are both
social institutions rather than characteristics of individuals. There is,
moreover, strong evidence that these institutions are overlapping and
mutually defining in important ways. Much of the writing by Black fem-
inists, both old and new, is devoted to explaining how it is that being a
woman is different if one is a Black woman rather than a white woman.
It is not simply that these writers are both Black and female, it is that
their experience of womanness is itself deeply infused by race.5" Seeing
gender as a social institution rather than an individual characteristic
makes plain the connections between gender and other social hierarchies
that undermine the essentialist project.
In addition, this phenomenon of interconnection is reinforced by
seeing certain characteristics as not merely possessions but constituents
of the self. As such, they are so deeply implicated in the self that no
other characteristic can be independent of them. Such constitutive
aspects of identity are not merely added to other aspects of identity,
rather they transform and transfuse them. It may be that both race and
gender, among other characteristics, are fundamental in this way for
most people in our society. A social constructivist vision of the self,
which emphasizes the permeability of the boundaries of identity and the
social foundations of selfhood, helps to explain how a role in a social
institution can become constitutive of, rather than merely a possession of,
the subject.
The result of the essentialist effort to isolate womanness, then, is
that women who experience these overlapping and interdependent identi-
ties are asked to fragment themselves in ways alien to their experience.59
While this violence to identity may be experienced by all women to some
57 Cf generally Mari J. Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human
Nature, 16 N.M. L. REV. 613 (1986) (providing a feminist critique of Rawls' technique of
abstraction in the original position).
58 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 44, at 596-601 (describing how many Black women experience (1)
beauty standards and (2) the social meaning of rape differently from white women); Pamela J.
Smith, Comment, We are not Sisters: African-American Women and the Freedom to Associate
and Disassociate, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1467, 1480-90 (1992) (describing the differences in the
experiences, past and present, of white women and African-American women).
59 See Audre Lorde, Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference, in SISTER OUT-
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extent, it is particularly acute for those women who are defined as differ-
ent from the norm along some axis other than gender. The more perva-
sive and hierarchical is the norm from which they deviate, the more
likely it is that they will not have the luxury of ignoring that aspect of
their identity; indeed, that aspect of identity may become fundamental in
a way that makes it impossible to separate their gender identity from it.
Once again, women who suffer these crosscutting and interdependent
forms of oppression will be excluded by an essentialist approach.
3. The political agenda
Finally, it is important to recognize that the risks created by the
omissions and assumptions of essentialism extend beyond these theoreti-
cal concerns to the very practical issue of political struggle and organiza-
tion. When "woman" is defined in such a way as to focus on only one
group of women, it is the interests of that group that will dominate the
political agenda. In the reproductive rights area, for example, the white,
middle-class, heterosexual focus has led to an overwhelming allocation of
resources to the struggle to secure abortion rights. While this struggle is,
indeed, of consequence to all women, there are other issues that may be
of equal or greater importance to other groups of women and that do not
receive anything approaching the same attention. The abuse of coerced
sterilization is a very real threat for women of color but not generally for
white women,' and the issues surrounding government funding for vari-
ous reproductive services-including drug treatment for pregnant
addicts and prenatal care as well as abortion-are of central concern to
poorer women but not to middle class women.61
Women need to acknowledge that we have somewhat different pol-
icy concerns and we must discuss openly the decision to place priority on
particular issues. The essentialist justification obscures these differences
and defers this dialogue. The social constructivist challenge to essential-
ism facilitates the recognition of differences and, therefore, places the
issue of exclusion-both in theory and in practice-front and center.
B. Difference and Sameness
The second way in which feminist theory has functioned to exclude
SIDER 114, 120 (1984); Deborah K. King, Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness: The
Context of a Black Feminist Ideology, 14 SIGNS 42, 51 (1988).
60 See Antonia Hernandez, Chicanas and the Issue of Involuntary Sterilization: Reforms Needed
to Protect Informed Consent, 3 CHICANO L. REV. 3 (1976); Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson, Reproduc-
tive Laws, Women of Color, and Low-Income Women, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 15 (1989).
61 Cf. Julianne Malveaux, Gender Difference and Beyond: An Economic Perspective on Diversity
and Commonality Among Women, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFER-
ENCE, supra note 30, at 226, 229-37 (describing the differences in the economic interests of
women that are created by racial discrimination).
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certain groups of women is closely related to essentialism. By framing
the feminist debate in terms of difference and sameness, theorists have
implicitly accepted our society's construction of difference as internal to
the different person. This construction not only facilitates essentialism, it
is also dangerous in its own right.
The "difference/sameness" debate has been a staple of feminist legal
theory for at least a generation now.62 The focus of this debate has been
on the ways in which women are the same as or different from men, and
the arguments for women's legal rights that can be made on each basis.
As many feminists have begun to realize, however, casting the debate in
these terms implicitly accepts the idea that difference is inherent in the
person, rather than a social construction generated by institutional
arrangements that privilege some people, leaving the others to look "dif-
ferent". 6a Asking how women are different from men focuses attention
on women's characteristics rather than on the ways in which institutions
(like traditional work patterns) privilege certain people (e.g. those with-
out childcare responsibilities) at the expense of others. We are then led
to ask about special rights for the disadvantaged group-with all of the
political and legal difficulties such rights entail-rather than to challenge
the underlying institutions in ways that change the norm against which
"difference" is measured. 64
The same is true for differences within the group "women". 65 To
cast the issue as a search for women's commonality, the "sameness" of
women that transcends our differences, is usually a way of asking women
of color (for example) to measure themselves against the implicit stan-
dard of white women in the same way that looking for the commonality
between women and men has generally meant asking women to measure
themselves against the implicit standard of maleness.66 It shifts attention
away from asking about the institutional and cultural structures that cre-
ate a norm and generate those differences of race, class, etc. Instead, the
62 Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Legal Scholarship, 77 IOWA L. REV. 19, 23 (1991); see also, Catha-
rine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1286-93
(1991).
63 MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERI-
CAN LAW 21 (1990).
64 See Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate.- A Post-Modern Path
Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296, 303-05; cf
Christine Di Stefano, Dilemmas of Difference.- Feminism, Modernity, and Postmodernity, in
FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM, supra note 4, at 63, 72-73 (the choice between difference and
sameness is a choice within the rationalist dichotomies, not outside them).
65 This aspect of the difference/sameness debate may, indeed, appear to be identical to essential-
ism, but-at least as I have defined essentialism-it is not. It would be possible to believe that
differences are internal to the person (the premise of difference/sameness arguments), but to
deny that there is some essential "womanness" that all women experience regardless of race,
class, etc. (the premise of esentialism arguments). In other words, the location of difference is
relevant to, but not identical to, the dependence or independence of various types of
differences.
66 Cf Cain, supra note 43, at 205-07 (making a similar argument about sexual orientation).
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norm is taken for granted as the starting point from which difference is
measured. As a result, racism, classism, homophobia and the other
social hierarchies that generate those norms are taken for granted as well.
It is no wonder that a feminism focused on "sameness" has not been very
appealing to women who find themselves on the bottom of these
hierarchies.
As Martha Minow has argued, a relational model of difference,
based on a social constructivist view, is an antidote to the assumption
that difference is inherent in the different person.6 7 This model allows us
to escape the fixation on sameness and difference by highlighting the
issues surrounding the institutional generation of a norm from which dif-
ference is measured rather than casting that social process into shadow.
As a result, it brings to the forefront the concerns of women defined as
different from that norm6" and leads to a more inclusionary feminism.
C. Inattention and Ignorance
While the theoretical orientations discussed in the previous sections
have accounted for much of modern feminism's exclusionary character,
it would be misleading to neglect a much simpler basis for that exclusion:
the organized women's movement has often failed to take the affirmative
steps necessary to bring in the voices of those who suffer from multiple
forms of oppression and has sometimes ignored their voices even when
they were there to speak.69 To say this is really to assert nothing more
than that a commitment to feminism does not, in and of itself, automati-
cally afford immunity from the various prejudices of our culture.70
A commitment to feminism is itself an achievement in our society,
purchased with struggle-both external and internal-and often at sub-
stantial cost. We should not expect awareness of the racism or classism
in our world and ourselves to be an easier achievement than awareness of
the sexism was. But, once again, a social constructionist view can help,
at least by focusing our attention on the need for such a struggle.
Once we abandon the Cartesian assumption that objective truth is
available to any sufficiently rational knower, we are left with the realiza-
tion that each knower is able to gather knowledge only from within her
own socially contingent framework. Every view is necessarily partial,
and no escape from our own framework can be completely successful.
We simply must depend on other people with different viewpoints to sup-
67 See generally, MINOW, supra note 63.
68 See id. at 95; cf HARDING, supra note 17, at 249-67 (describing how an approach from within
a lesbian perspective could illuminate the limitation and biases of social institutions, including
feminism).
69 See Malveaux, supra note 61, at 236-67. See generally PAULA GIDDINGS, WHERE I ENTER:
THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA (1982).
70 See Smith, supra note 58, at 1472-80 (describing racism in the women's movement).
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plement our perspectives. In other words, no effort of objectivity or
universality will allow white women alone to generate the knowledge
that they could acquire if they listened to women of color. Nor can we
rest with our own partial perspective, assuming that it has some claim to
truth unavailable to other perspectives. Those very different views of
reality have an equal epistemological pedigree, an equal claim to be heard
and to guide our practice.
Thus, social constructionism, if taken seriously, is a constant
reminder that we must seek out and carefully attend to the voices of
those whose social framework gives them a very different perspective
from our own. 7 This epistemology gives us no excuse for either univer-
salizing or privileging our own perspective. Social constructionism also
helps to combat the tendencies to see difference as inherent rather than
relational, and to build essentialist systems of theory on such inherent
differences. It insists that we search out and scrutinize the socially con-
structed norm against which difference is measured. In all of these ways,
social constructionism contributes to opening up feminist theory and
practice to women who have long been excluded from them.
III. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM'S THREAT TO FEMINISM
For all of its value, however, the social constructionist position
poses some serious threats to feminist projects, both theoretical and polit-
ical. The first, and perhaps largest, threat is that social constructionism
will leave feminists without a standard by which to justify their criticism
of gender oppression. The second, related, danger is that it will so
"decenter" the subject or self that the concept "woman" will become
useless as the basis either for theory or for political organization. And
the third difficulty is that the postmodernist turn may lead us to an
approach focused on play and critique rather than on useful, purposeful,
and responsible transformation aimed at the real suffering of real people.
A. Truth, Judgment, and Justification
In order to see how social constructivism threatens to destroy stan-
dards of justification, it is useful to imagine the two extreme cases of
cultural coherence. First, if the cultural context is conceived as mono-
lithic and consistent (either generally or for any given individual), then it
is difficult to see how an individual can achieve sufficient critical distance
from her context to recognize elements of it that may be pernicious. Sec-
71 See HARDING, supra note 17, at 124 (knowledge seeking requires broad-based participation);
Susan R. Bordo, Feminism, Postmodernism, and Gender-Skepticism, in FEMINISM/
POSTMODERNISM, supra note 4, at 133, 140 (attending too vigilantly to difference can also be
problematic in constructing an other who is an exotic alien, a breed apart).
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ond, if the cultural context is conceived as multifaceted and potentially
inconsistent, then it is difficult to see what standard an individual could
use to choose between conflicting values or interpretations.72
Assume for a moment that we have a society with a unified, consis-
tent culture and that it is that culture which guides the process of know-
ing (of defining questions, of recognizing and interpreting data, etc.).
How would it be possible for us to escape from that culture sufficiently to
criticize it, to recognize its destructive elements and to see the possibility
of an alternative toward which our society might move? If the very ques-
tions we ask and the data we perceive are shaped by those cultural
assumptions, how can we ever detach from them sufficiently to compare
them to the alternatives and find them wanting? This is the problem that
Margaret Radin has called "bad coherence. ' '7 3
A social constructionist might respond that we never can escape
totally, and we can never be certain that we have escaped. Even when we
feel that we have broken free of our context, we should always be vigilant
to search out the ways in which our cultural assumptions continue to
shape our responses. Feminists, in particular, are quite adamant about
the need for this type of scrutiny, of ourselves as well as of others. The
concepts in which feminist ideas must be expressed reproduce the very
cultural categories that feminism means to challenge.74 As Audre Lorde
so eloquently put it, how can the tools of the master be used to dismantle
the master's house?75
But while total or confident escape may be impossible, feminists in
such a consistent culture would have to believe in the possibility of some
degree of extra-contextual criticism. If we are truly and completely
trapped within our cultural assumptions, then feminism would never be
possible in a sexist society. But feminists want to assert both that femi-
72 Admittedly, the first situation is unlikely. In even the most repressive totalitarian society
there are some contradictory cultural forces, if only among a minority. See Elizabeth P.
Hodges, Writing in a Different Voice, 66 TEX. L. REV. 629, 632 (1988) ("The language of
society, like the language of a novel, is a system of varied and opposing voices continually
developing and renewing itself. These voices do not all have equal time and value, but they
guarantee, in the view of Mikhail Bakhtin, a perpetual linguistic and intellectual revolution
which guards against the hegemony of any single 'language of truth' or 'official language' in a
society, against ossification and stagnation in thought." (citing MIKHAIL BAKHTIN, THE DIA-
LOGIC IMAGINATION 64-68, 262-75 (Michael Holmquist ed.; Caryl Emerson & Michael
Holmquist trans., (1981))). It would probably be more accurate to conceive of this as a con-
tinuum, running from the imaginary monolith at one end to the equally imaginary total chaos
at the other end, with all actual societies falling somewhere in the middle. The argument in
text simplifies this situation by treating it as two separate categories rather than a continuum,
but it is valid nonetheless: at any point on the continuum (other than the end points) a society
will suffer from both of the difficulties described in the text, but to differing degrees.
73 See Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1710, 1720
(1990).
74 See John Shotter & Josephine Logan, The Pervasiveness of Patriarchy. On Finding a Different
Voice, in FEMINIST THOUGHT AND THE STRUCTURE OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 5, at 69,
69-70.
75 See LORDE, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in SISTER OUT-
SIDER, supra note 59, at 110.
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nism is possible and that our society is sexist. How can that be? How do
we acquire the ability to see the world through a feminist lens if our
culture consistently uses a sexist lens? "How is it possible to have an
engaged truth that does not simply reiterate its determinants?" 76 How
can a critical distance be created?"
Various feminists have suggested several answers to that question.
Perhaps the most common answer is "experience". "[Feminism's] pro-
ject is to uncover and claim as valid the experience of women, the major
content of which is the devaluation of women's experience."78 It is, they
argue, precisely the lack of fit between what we actually experience and
what our culture tells us we should (or do) experience that creates the
possibility of escape. Alison Jagger has described what she calls "outlaw
emotions": emotions that are not socially sanctioned but that are exper-
ienced because one's social situation makes the cost of the approved emo-
tion too high.79 For example, there are times when it is simply too
demeaning to feel flattered by sexual harassment, and then we feel the
outlaw emotions of anger and fear. Outlaw emotions are not only politi-
cally subversive, but also epistemologically subversive because they are
incompatible with dominant perceptions and values.8" They create, in
other words, a crack in the cultural edifice.
It is true that these emotions and experiences must then be
expressed in the conceptual categories provided by our culture and that
can cause them to be distorted. Some writers have suggested that this is
why feminist ideas may best be expressed through forms-like poetry,
metaphor, myth, and fantasy-that allow for more complex and creative
meanings to be generated."1 Feminists must, in a sense, write a new lan-
guage to name their experience and, through naming, to make that expe-
rience real and visible for the first time.82
76 MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 635, 638. MacKinnon goes on to point out that "[d]is-engaged
truth only reiterates its determinants." Id. That is, even when we think we are free, we are
not. That may very well be true, but it does not explain how a feminist escape is possible.
77 See Patterson, supra note 7, at 279.
78 MacKinnon, Feminism, supra note 30, at 635. Consciousness raising is one of the primary
methods through which experience is transformed into knowledge. See Radin, supra note 73,
at 1721; Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 863-64
(1990).
79 See Jagger, supra note 17, at 160.
80 Id. at 161-62.
81 See DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM, DECONSTRUC-
TION, AND THE LAW 165-196 (1991); Cornell, supra note 51, at 696-98 (discussing how myth
plays a significant role in feminist theory by providing a touchstone for identity); J. G. Moraw-
ski, Impasse in Feminist Thought?, in FEMINIST THOUGHT AND THE STRUCTURE OF KNOWL-
EDGE, supra note 5, at 182, 191 ("She is its other, the fantasy side of male reality. Thus to
women, fantasy may offer an entrance into her subjectivity. Above all, fantasy predicates
transformation.... At the center of feminist thinking is imagination.... Although rooted in
a negative comprehension of the fixed boundaries of language, writing, and experience, femi-
nist imagination is a positive venture.").
82 See Rose, supra note 7, at 58 ("[Naming] brings into existence phenomena and experiences
hitherto denied space in both nature and culture.").
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This process of creating new meaning through existing language is
difficult enough, but it is not the major problem with this approach. The
larger issue is how we could come to have the outlaw experiences and
emotions in the first place in such a monolithic culture. According to the
social constructionist theory, experience, including emotional experience,
does not come in prepackaged bundles; we recognize only those exper-
iences that our culture gives us the conceptual tools to recognize.8 3 How
then can we recognize these experiences when our culture is telling us
that they don't exist? In other words, why are we not all victims of false
consciousness, perhaps feeling anger (for example), but suppressing it
and not recognizing it as such when our culture tells us anger is not an
appropriate response?84
Alison Jagger acknowledges that these outlaw emotions stand in a
dialectical relationship with critical theory; each gives rise to the other.85
That is, the critical theory allows us to recognize, name, and thereby
make real our outlaw emotions; these outlaw emotions show us the gap
between our experience and our cultural assumptions that gives rise to
critical theory. The difficulty here is that outlaw emotions cannot be
used to explain how critical theory comes into existence if their own
existence presupposes the availability of some degree of critical theory.
In other words, these experiences and emotions cannot create feminism
in a society that is coherently and thoroughly sexist because, unless some
feminist conceptual categories are available already, those experiences
and emotions will not even be perceived to exist.
To say that these experiences could be perceived in the absence of
such concepts is to reject the basic premise of social constructionism
itself: that knowledge and experience are always mediated by cultural
conceptual categories. If women can recognize sexual harassment as har-
assment in a culture that sees sexual advances as flattering rather than
demeaning or threatening, then why couldn't male scientists recognize
when they are more directly experiencing an objective reality, rather than
one distorted by cultural assumptions? A social constructionist cannot
escape this difficulty by positing a basis for experience free from cultural
categories without risking the whole critique of Cartesianism.
This difficulty with the critique is worth exploring because social
constructionists, including feminists, sometimes describe the existing cul-
ture as though it were a consistent monolith, at least on certain issues
such as sexism and patriarchy.86 In fact, twentieth century American
culture is anything but monolithic. We are presented with a complex
83 See Jagger, supra note 17, at 150-51.
84 See Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Crit*que of
Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L. J. 81, 85 (1987) (when you have no social recogni-
tion for your pain, you may yourself experience it differently).
85 See Jagger, supra note 17, at 160.
86 See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 638.
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and confusing collection of cultural categories, including the influences
of many other cultures and many previous eras, some of which are in
tension with or in direct contradiction to each other. And this complex-
ity and contradiction exists on gender issues as well. In light of this situ-
ation, it is not at all implausible that the seeds of feminism, along with
other dissenting positions, can be found in the culture itself, alongside the
sexism it opposes. This cultural complexity solves the problem of how
we can recognize experience that contradicts some of our cultural catego-
ries: we recognize it because it is consistent with, or even required by,
other conceptual categories that are also part of our inconsistent culture.
Such an inconsistent culture raises, however, a different problem. If
the culture allows for different, even contradictory, answers on questions
as fundamental as the nature of gender identities and relations, how can
we settle disputes between those who adopt these differing views? Both
in relations between private individuals-as in a dispute between a hus-
band and wife over how much housework and child-care the husband
ought to do-and in the design of public policies and programs-as in
the decision whether to punish sexual harassment as gender discrimina-
tion, or whether publicly to fund day care-competing visions would
lead to very different results. Where can we find a standard with which
to decide between them if our own culture, the only standard available to
us under social constructionism, includes both?87
The response of some feminists seems to be that such value conflicts
are indeed unresolvable and will (and should) remain so. One branch of
feminist theorists seems, in fact, to have adopted the irreducibility of
multiple viewpoints as a value in itself."8 It is, however, one thing to
accept, even celebrate, descriptive relativism-the claim that we all see
the world in different ways-and quite another to accept moral or deci-
sional relativism-the claim that there is no standard to judge between
our various visions on moral or other grounds. Feminism, because it
must at a minimum reject certain types of oppression of women, cannot
accept moral relativism of this kind. It cannot be neutral as between
different value systems, some of which oppress women and others of
which do not.89 Seyla Benhabib, who is extremely sympathetic to the
87 See Patterson, supra note 8, at 307 ("Nothing validates one picture (or a picture about how to
choose a picture) over another.").
88 See Smith, supra note 24, at 93 ("There are and must be different experiences of the word and
different bases of experience"); Rhoda K. Unger, Psychological, Feminist, and Personal Episte-
mologies: Transcending Contradiction, in FEMINIST THOUGHT AND THE STRUCTURE OF
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 5, at 124, 136; cf Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered,
101 HARV. L. REv. 10, 16 (1987) ("Instead of a new solution, I urge struggles over descrip-
tions of reality.").
89 See GRIMSHAW, supra note 30, at 99-100; Farganis, supra note 28, at 217; cf Rose, supra note
7, at 73-74 (suggesting that the choice between a plurality of discourses and feminism as a
truer, better view is itself a dichotomy which should be transcended, but not explaining how to
do so).
This is not to say that all value conflicts must be resolvable; some irreducible conflicts
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social constructionist project, put the matter this way: we cannot ignore
the fact that such conflicts "pose[ ] moral as well as cognitive problems,
or that the question of validity inevitably confronts us, and that we can-
not extricate ourselves from an answer by gazing in wonderment at the
plurality of language games and life-forms."'9
Thus, social constructionism seems to degenerate either into simple
conventionalism or into a kind of cultural relativism.9' Conventionalism
is, in a sexist society, obviously inadequate for feminism. Relativism,
whatever one may think of it in general, is also insufficient to meet the
purposes of feminism. Feminists must be able to say that gender oppres-
sion is wrong, not just that their perspective on it is one valid approach
among many. 92 To be an acceptable basis for a feminist epistemology,
social constructionism must be modified or supplemented to provide
some standard for criticism, of both our culture generally and the view-
points of particular persons or groups within it.93
Social constructivism falls into this dilemma in part because it ulti-
mately fails to escape the Cartesian framework it seeks to challenge. The
Cartesian knower has been described as trying to perform the "God
trick" by achieving a "view from nowhere," 94 because he seeks to dis-
tance himself from any culturally contingent location. In attempting to
refute the possibility of such a transcendent position, the social construc-
tionist has described and celebrated a multiplicity of valid (though par-
tial) viewpoints. As Susan Bordo has pointed out,
the question remains, however, how the human knower is to negotiate this
infinitely perspectival, destabilized world. Deconstructionism answers
with constant vigilant suspicion of all determinate readings of culture and
a partner aesthetic of ceaseless textual play as an alternative ideal. Here is
where deconstruction may slip into its own fantasy of escape from human
locatedness-by supposing that the critic can become wholly protean by
adopting endlessly shifting, seemingly inexhaustible vantage points, none
may remain in any moral system. But in order for feminism to claim any transformative
potential, it must offer a way to assert that the point of view it provides is superior to (not just
equally valid as) the competing sexist viewpoint that is also enshrined in our cultural values.
This is one value conflict on which feminism may not remain neutral. See Bartlett, supra note
78, at 879.
90 Benhabib, supra note 13, at 129.
91 See Eloise A. Buker, Rhetoric in Postmodern Feminism: Put-Offs, Put-Ons, and Political Plays,
in THE INTERPRETIVE TURN: PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, CULTURE 218, 224-25 (David R. Hiley
et al., eds., 1991).
92 See Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, (1990) (arguing that
feminist theory should be committed to promoting gender equality as a normative ideal).
93 See Benhabib, supra note 13, at 122 (arguing that without a justification for certain moral
commitments, Lyotard's epistemology leads either to neoliberal pluralism or conventionalist
pragmatism). We also need some standards for cross-cultural judgment and criticism. Such
judgments are epistemologically parallel to ones within a culture that is itself contradictory or
composed of subcultures, but they may raise additional moral issues.
94 Bordo, supra note 71, at 142; Donna Haraway, Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in
Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective, 14 FEMINIST STUDIES 575, 584 (1988)
("vision from everywhere and nowhere equally and fully").
FEMINIST LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY
of which are 'owned' by either the critic or the author of a text under
examination.9 5
The injunction to celebrate and participate in multiple perspectives,
with no prescription for choice among them, denies the "somewhere"
that we all do and must inhabit. "[T]he philosopher's fantasy of tran-
scendence has not yet been abandoned. . . . [Instead, it has] been
replaced with a new postmodern configuration of detachment, a new
imagination of disembodiment: a dream of being everywhere."9 6 Rather
than the view from nowhere, we have the view from everywhere.
This lapse into transcendence is caused by the failure of social con-
structionism to escape from the underlying Cartesian view of objectivity.
Having accepted the skeptical dilemma around which mainstream episte-
mology is constructed 97-that there must be only one truth or no truth at
all-and having rejected the Cartesian attempt to build a foundation for
a single truth, social constructionists find themselves with no way to dis-
tinguish between truth and falsity in the multiplicity of viewpoints.9 8
They have challenged the Cartesian notion that truth must be transcen-
dent and unitary, but only in order to say that such a truth is impossible,
not to provide an alternative account of a situated truth that might jus-
tify a choice between viewpoints. As a consequence of this "Cartesian
echo," they are left with no truth at all and so are insufficient to the
feminist task of identifying and resisting the oppression of women.
B. The Nature of the Subject
A second danger to feminism posed by social constructionism con-
cerns the challenge it represents to the Enlightenment concept of the sub-
ject or self. The subject, or knower, who emerges from the Cartesian
assumptions is clearly separated from the external world that is the
object of knowledge and possesses firm identity boundaries. The funda-
mental aspects of the self are stable and presocial: primarily reason itself.
Social constructionism challenges this concept of the self by showing
that subjects are deeply dependent on the social definition provided by
culture and deeply fragmented by cultural tensions and contradictions.9 9
"Postmodernists ask us to cease thinking of ourselves as having identities
and to begin understanding ourselves as sites for competing cultural
interpretations." 1" It is this socially defined "subject" that allows the
refutation of essentialism and the deconstruction of difference. Social
95 Bordo, supra note 71, at 142.
96 Id. at 143.
97 See SANDRA HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM, 107 (1986); Patterson, supra
note 8, at 263.
98 See HARDING, supra note 17, at 187.
99 See Patterson, supra note 8, at 278.
100 Buker, supra note 91, at 227.
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constructionism's success in blurring the boundaries between inside and
outside may, however, call into question the coherence of "the subject"
as a concept at all. 101
This disintegration of the self creates certain difficulties for femi-
nism. From a theoretical point of view, "[i]f there is no subject, who is
left to emancipate?"102 The very idea of gender oppression requires that
we be able to identify a subject-"women"-which has both epistemo-
logical and moral significance. 03 But if the permeability of identity
boundaries leads to their complete collapse, then the subject can no
longer function as a meaningful unit for the purposes of either knowledge
claims or moral claims."°
Moreover, the concept of gender oppression requires that we be able
to identify power arrangements that qualify as "oppression." The disin-
tegration of the self, however, leads social constructionism to blur the
lines of power, seeing power as everywhere, as a discursive background,
rather than as a force used by some particular people against others. 0 5
After all, when there are no meaningful subjects left, power becomes an
attribute of social institutions rather than of persons. Given the continu-
ing pattern of patriarchal violence against women, however, feminists
cannot afford to dispense with the notion of power as violence against the
subject.106 The directionality of power-its use by some particular people
against others-is as significant for feminist purposes as its background
pervasiveness.
Nor can feminists manage without the subject on a more practical
level. Both the small-scale consciousness-raising and the large-scale
political organizing that form the framework of a feminist movement
depend on a notion of the subject. One of the most pernicious and dam-
aging aspects of gender oppression-and one particularly apparent from
the perspective of legal theory-has been the denial to women of the sta-
tus of subjects or persons.'0 7 The reclamation of a self within, a self
101 See James Boyle, Is Subjectivity Possible? The Postmodern Subject in Legal Theory, 62 U. COL.
L. REV. 489, 497 (1991). See generally, Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L.
REV. 1627 (1991) (describing the disintegration of the subject in a broad range ofjurispruden-
tial schools). But, cf. JANE FLAX, THINKING FRAGMENTS 216-17 (1990) (arguing that the
writing of some postmodernists reinstates a transcendent subject by incorporating a romantic/
aesthetic form of heroic creativity).
102 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble, Feminist Theory and Psychoanalytic Discourse, in FEMINISM/
POSTMODERNISM, supra note 4, at 324, 327.
103 See Patterson, supra note 8, at 260 n.25, 261.
104 See Bartlett, supra note 78, at 879-80.
105 See FLAX, supra note 101, at 207 (describing Foucault's theory of power).
106 See Robin West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory, and Law, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59, 59-64
(1989).
107 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 0430 ("[T]he husband and wife are one per-
son in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the
marriage . . ."). This denial of personhood is, of course, also one of the hallmarks of the
oppression suffered by African American women and men; FLAX, supra note 101, at 219; see
also, PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 153 (1991).
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denied by patriarchy, is one of the central achievements of the conscious-
ness-raising method.108 Indeed, the rise of social constructionism and
postmodernism at precisely this moment may appear highly suspicious:
just when previously silenced persons have begun to speak for them-
selves, the concept of the subject and the possibility of truth come under
fire. 9
Moreover, political progress seems to depend on a meaningful sub-
ject. "To the extent that feminist politics is bound up with a specific
constituency or subject, namely, women, the postmodernist prohibition
against subject-centered inquiry and theory undermines the legitimacy of
a broad-based organized movement dedicated to articulating and imple-
menting the goals of such a constituency." ' 0 A political movement
must be organized around something. Even if it avoids the potential
essentialism of an identity politics, it requires the sorts of subjects that
can have interests, or rights, or values that are both minimally identifi-
able and morally significant." 1 Participants in the movement must see
themselves as such subjects in order to motivate action, and other mem-
bers of the polity must also see them that way if they are to have any
impact. The successful deconstruction of subjectivity would undermine
such political action.
C. Play versus Responsibility
Finally, social constructionism, poststructuralism, and postmodern-
ism pose a more diffuse, atmospheric problem for feminism. These intel-
lectual movements are sometimes characterized by a desire to "hav[e] it
any way they want. They refuse to assume a shape for which they must
take responsibility.""' 2  They "replace [Cartesian] metaphors of
spectatorship with metaphors of dance; ... relinquish.., fantasies...
soberly fixed on necessity and unity [in favor of] those that are intoxi-
cated with possibility and plurality."" ' 3
Such a constantly shifting, playful attitude can be exhilarating and
liberating. It frees us to reimagine reality in endlessly new and creative
ways. It challenges us to attempt to see the world from someone else's
108 West, supra note 106, at 89; cf MARY F. BELENKY, ET AL., WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF, VOICE AND MIND 133 (1986) ("[The] quest for self and voice
plays a central role in transformations in women's ways of knowing.").
109 See FLAX, supra note 101, at 220; Di Stefano, supra note 64, at 75 (citing Nancy Hartsock,
Wendy Brown, and Jane Flax).
11o Di Stefano, supra note 64, at 76.
II See Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts, and Possibilities, 1 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 7,9 (1989) ("The problem, of course, is how to combine the claim of the
constitutiveness of social relations with the value of self-determination.").
112 Bordo, supra note 71, at 144.
113 Id. at 145.
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perspective. It is undeniably an important part of any project that seeks,
as feminism does, to be inclusionary and liberatory.
But this attitude can also be a barrier, a barrier both to an adequate
appreciation of difference and to a responsible stance toward the actual
suffering of real human beings. If human beings had a truly infinite
capacity to assume the perspective of another, real difference would be
impossible; we would be transparent to one another. It is our particular-
ity, and the boundedness that it creates, that makes otherness possible.114
To refuse to recognize (indeed, even to celebrate) that boundedness is to
refuse to recognize or celebrate difference. We should, of course, make
the effort of understanding, the effort to broaden our individual contexts,
but a context that includes everything means nothing, and without mean-
ingful contexts there would be no human diversity to celebrate. We must
take seriously the ineradicability of otherness.11 5
Playfulness also fails to take seriously the real pain caused by certain
perspectives and cultural contexts. We cannot simply reserve judgment,
critiquing and deconstructing existing concepts and contexts but refusing
to commit ourselves to some and not others. We should not be willing to
adopt every perspective, including that of the wife batterer or child
abuser, without making judgments about which are better and worse.
The attitude of playfulness is morally inappropriate, indeed irresponsible,
when the cost of certain kinds of diversity is paid in suffering.116 If femi-
nism is committed to taking women's experiences seriously, and if
women have experienced much of that suffering, feminism simply cannot
adopt this attitude.117
Although I have described these three difficulties with social con-
structionism separately, each is of course implicated in the others.
Together they form a whole that threatens to rob feminism of its critical
bite and its moral and political force. These are not superficial difficul-
ties; they arise from the same basic components of social constructionism
that account for its usefulness to feminism in critiquing Cartesianism and
redressing exclusion. The challenge, then, is to find a way to retain the
useful aspects while softening the impact of their dangerous implications.
114 Id.
115 See Iris Marion Young, The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference, in FEMINISM/
POSTMODERNISM, supra note 4, at 309-10.
116 See Mar J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1763, 1768-71 (1990).
117 See HARDING, supra note 17, at 304. But see Frug, supra note 52, at 1047-48 (arguing that the
"flip, condescending, and mocking" style of postmodernism should not disqualify it for femi-
nist use).
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IV. FEMINIST STRATEGIES FOR RECONCEIVING SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTIONISM
Some feminist theorists, both in and outside of law, have accepted
this challenge. Three of the most common strategies for reconceiving
social constructionism are: first, to adopt a standpoint epistemology; sec-
ond, to incorporate pragmatist methods and insights; and third, to
attempt to define and justify a standard for judgment that is in some
sense culturally independent but still not transcendent. In my view, it
has been difficult to pursue these strategies successfully because we lack a
clear idea of how a solution could be both consistent with the basic prem-
ises of social constructionism and sufficient as a guide for resolving con-
flicting perspectives. While such a guide may never generate certainty, a
sufficient standard must provide us with mechanisms for narrowing the
legitimate alternatives to a manageable number and with a stock of argu-
ments or concerns through which to evaluate those alternatives. I will
suggest that the most promising path in feminist epistemology is one
which explores and clarifies the nature of a situated and sufficient form of
judgment.
A. Standpoint Epistemologies
In order to deal with a heterogeneous culture, several writers have
suggested a sort of procedural basis for deciding between competing
viewpoints and values. They claim that women, along with other
oppressed groups, have an "epistemic advantage" that gives them a bet-
ter claim to see clearly than those who are higher up in the social hierar-
chy.11 8 The reason for this advantage is that oppressed groups must
understand, and to some extent internalize, the dominant culture in
order to survive, but they live simultaneously in a different subculture.
In other words, members of oppressed groups find themselves in two dif-
ferent, and often contradictory contexts. This disjunction gives them the
distance from each context that allows them to adopt a critical perspec-
tive toward it. Such distance is either impossible or much more difficult
for members of the dominant group because they live wholly within a
majority culture that reflects and legitimates their experience. It is this
critical distance that constitutes the epistemic advantage of the
oppressed. 19 And it is this advantage that justifies preferring the view-
118 See Jagger, supra note 17, at 162; Farganis, supra note 28, at 217; Bartlett, supra note 78, at
872-77. Bartlett criticizes standpoint epistemology on four grounds: (1) it tends to essentialize
women, thereby ignoring important differences and imposing the views of some on others; (2)
it ignores the possibility that other "standpoints" may also yield knowledge; (3) it must rely on
a doubtful and dangerous false consciousness argument to explain the differences in women's
views; and (4) it creates an adversarial "we/they" politics. Id.
119 See HARDING, supra note 17, at 124, 131-32; Nancy C.M. Hartsock, The Feminist Standpoint:
Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism, in FEMINISM AND
METHODOLOGY, supra note 24, at 157, 159-60; Uma Narayan, The Project of Feminist Episte-
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point of the oppressed to the viewpoint of the dominant group.
Such a means of deciding between competing claims of value or
vision without reference to their particular content would, of course, be
very useful. Moreover, if the epistemic advantage is simply a prima facie
claim that brings to the center of our attention those perspectives that
have been most ignored in a society, this approach has much to recom-
mend it.120 Nonetheless, I think there are serious difficulties with a
standpoint epistemology if it is actually used to resolve disputes rather
than merely to frame them.
The first set of difficulties consists of problems of application. First,
it is not always easy to tell which group is oppressed and in relation to
whom.'21 If two oppressed groups-say, women generally on the one
hand and working class or poor men on the other hand-have competing
values, how do we decide this issue? Do we ask who is more oppressed in
general? Who is more oppressed on the particular issue in question? Do
we look for some group that is at the very bottom of the hierarchy and
have their views guide us about everything?
Second, it is simplistic, and contradicted by their own accounts, to
assert that the members of an oppressed group will all share the same
vision or values on any given issue. Feminism has, indeed, been strug-
gling for some time with the reality of diversity among women. When
there is disagreement, which oppressed voice should guide us-the
majority of the oppressed (because they better represent the whole group)
or the minority (because they are even further oppressed and distanced
from their context by being dissenters within their own group)?
These practical difficulties are, moreover, compounded by concep-
tual ones. Being between two contexts or cultures is probably a charac-
teristic of a majority of people in late twentieth-century America rather
than a unique experience of some small determinate group that could be
called oppressed. In our extremely diverse society, almost everyone will
be part of a subculture of one type or another. Not only gender and race,
but religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, economic class, physical chal-
lenges, occupation, and many less obvious characteristics can bring a per-
son into contact with subcultures which differ, to varying degrees, from
the dominant culture. It is true, of course, that members of groups with
certain characteristics-a culture that covers many aspects of life rather
than just a few, and a culture that is despised by the majority-may have
mology: Perspectives from a Nonwestern Feminist, in GENDER/BODY/KNOWLEDGE, supra
note 4, at 256, 265-66 (arguing that oppressed groups such as women acquire a "double
vision" that allows them fluency in both their own contexts and their oppressor's context).
120 See HARDING, supra note 17, at 126 (women as losers in the battle of the sexes didn't get to
write the history; we need to add their side to complete it); Mar J. Matsuda, When the First
Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7,
9 (1989) (arguing for the need to understand the particulars of the lives of the oppressed).
121 See Deborah L. Rhode, supra note 92, at 624.
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a more intense experience of conflict between the two contexts, which
may generate more of a critical distance. But that issue is one of degree
and will vary with the particular circumstances of an individual; no
group can claim a special privilege that is necessarily unavailable to
many people.
Perhaps even more importantly, people who experience this conflict
of contexts do not necessarily respond by creating a critical distance
between themselves and each context. The conflict can lead instead to a
rejection of one context and the wholesale adoption of the other, or to
dichotomizing one's life so that one culture applies without conflict to
certain aspects (e.g. domestic life guided by the values of the "feminine"
subculture), while the other culture applies to other aspects (e.g. work
life guided by the values of the dominant masculinist culture).122 Neither
of these strategies would necessarily contribute to the achievement of
critical distance.
Moreover, the critical distance that can be achieved if one remains
simultaneously in contradictory cultures is purchased at a cost. Those
who feel themselves to be shaped by a subculture that is despised by the
majority often suffer very real emotional scars from that experience. The
"oppressed [may be] in fundamental ways damaged by their social expe-
rience." '123 Standpoint epistemology may perpetuate a fantasy of inno-
cence, when in fact the oppressed often are not "innocent": their own
internal culture is implicated in and shaped by the systems of
oppression. "'
Another price commonly paid by those who straddle two cultures is
a "sense of totally lacking roots or any space where one is at home in a
relaxed manner."'25 This sense, like the damaging scars inflicted by
majority disdain, might itself have certain systematic implications for
one's value choices. Those substantive implications may be good or bad,
but they would have to be assessed independently in order to determine
how they affect the usefulness of this approach. That assessment will
require some moral standard that addresses the substantive question of
how to choose between different values and visions. Thus, a standpoint
epistemology faces both practical and conceptual difficulties and it seems
incomplete without the addition of a substantive analysis.
Sandra Harding, one of the most thoughtful proponents of a stand-
point epistemology, recognizes these flaws and is attempting to construct
a standpoint theory with a standard for a new, "strong" objectivity built
into it.
122 See Narayan, supra note 119, at 266.
123 Flax, supra note 4, at 56.
124 See Di Stefano, supra note 64, at 72; Harris, supra note 44, at 608-09; Cherrie Moraga, La
Guera in THIS BRIDGE CALLED My BACK, supra note 41, at 27, 27-34.
125 Narayan, supra note 119, at 266.
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A feminist standpoint epistemology requires strengthened standards of
objectivity. The standpoint epistemologies call for recognition of a histori-
cal or sociological or cultural relativism-but not for a judgmental or epis-
temological relativism. They call for the acknowledgement that all human
beliefs ... are socially situated, but they also require a critical evaluation
to determine which social situations tend to generate the most objective
knowledge claims.' 26
In light of this demand for objectivity, Harding distinguishes between a
perspective-"which anyone can have simply by 'opening one's eyes' "-
and a standpoint-which is "an achievement," 127 an "objective perspec-
tive from women's lives that gives legitimacy to feminist knowledge." 128
And she endorses a distinction between" 'good' and 'bad' belief forma-
tion and legitimation," both of which are socially caused but only one of
which leads to true or better knowledge. 129
The inclusion of a sufficiently well-defined theory of objectivity
would solve some of the problems noted above. It would specify which
outlooks were entitled to this privilege--only standpoints, not mere per-
spectives-and it would explain why they were privileged: because they
are more objective. Harding's definition of objectivity, which centers on
valuing and being able to assume (temporarily) the perspective of the
Other,130 even helps to explain why the oppressed position of certain
groups gives their members a greater claim to objectivity: members of
oppressed groups learn, as a matter of survival, how to adopt the per-
spectives of others, so they are more likely to have an objective view.
But Harding has not spelled out the nature of this situated objectiv-
ity sufficiently to resolve the difficulties posed by social constructivism.
We need to know more about what "good reasons" are or we will have
no way to evaluate and choose between the various perspectives of others
once we have tried them on. Harding says that good reasons "do not
refer to transcendental, certain grounds for belief of the sort claimed by
conventional epistemologies [nor do they] privilege what any group of
actual, historical humans say about how they see the world... ." ' She
suggests that they rest instead on some normative values,' 3 2 but she
neither specifies those values in detail nor attempts to explain their
source or justification.
Moreover, the relation of such values to standpoint epistemology is
somewhat problematic. If the values are determinate enough, then it is
no longer clear what work "standpoints" do. If the goal is to identify
126 HARDING, supra note 17, at 142.
127 Id. at 127.
128 Id. at 167.
129 Id. at 149, n.17.
130 See id. at 151.
131 Id. at 169.
132 Id.
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beliefs that are justified by good reasons, rather than by social causes
alone, then why shouldn't we address that issue directly? Why do we
need to privilege any standpoint at the beginning? For example, if, as
Harding suggests, one of these values is a respect for Otherness that
attempts neither to deny the existence of the Other nor to exert unilateral
control over the Other,1 33 then we can use that standard to measure
beliefs directly. We do not need to look for groups whose experience is
most likely to lead them to this value and then privilege their perspec-
tives. A standpoint epistemology is a clumsy and less reliable path to
that goal.
This problem arises because it is simply not clear in what sense this
value or standard (i.e. this objectivity) is situated. It is situatedness that
the "standpoint" captures. Until we have an adequate description of
what it means for a standard to be both independent and situated, we will
continue to oscillate between the Cartesian poles of universalism and
normative relativism. Although Harding has correctly perceived this
Scylla and Charybdis, and carefully avoided both, she has not yet
described the path in enough detail for the rest of us to follow her.
B. Pragmatism
Another strategy some feminists have adopted to deal with the diffi-
culties of social constructionism is to embrace pragmatism. Although
pragmatism is no more easily susceptible of definition than feminism, I
believe it is fair to characterize it as an approach or practice that eschews
abstract, general, and transcendent systems of thought in favor of think-
ing that is contextual and situated (always embodied in particular prac-
tices) and instrumental (meant to solve particular problems).' 34 While it
emphasizes a local specificity that allies it with the social construction-
ists, the instrumentalism of pragmatic thought keeps it firmly normative
rather than skeptical.' 35 Our moral positions therefore "reflect[s] not
objective truth, but the grammar of what it means to be us," '36 where the
boundaries of "us" are themselves normatively contested concepts.137
Some pragmatist feminists seem content to rest with this method-
ological formulation of pragmatism. Joan Williams, for example, sug-
gests the types of questions we must ask ourselves in order pragmatically
to assess systems of thought and the social practices in which they are
133 See id. at 152-56.
134 See Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 798 (1989);
Radin, supra note 73, at 1707-09.
135 See Margaret Jane Radin & Frank Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal
Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1019, 1037 n.76 (1991) (pragmatism cannot be nihilism).
136 Joan C. Williams, Rorty, Radicalism, Romanticism: The Politics of the Gaze, 1992 Wis. L.
REV. 131, 134.
137 See Radin, supra note 73, at 1726.
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embodied. The issues, she contends, are: "what would life have to look
like to make this a justifiable choice? ... [and] [d]o I want to change in
the ways I would have to in order to adopt this novel point of view?"' 38
This formulation of the issues does address some of the difficulties with
social constructionism. It recenters a concept of identity, while continu-
ing to insist on a high degree of social construction of self. It does not
require coherence in that identity, but it does require that we not be so
totally fragmented and without boundaries that we are unable to talk
about "who we are." Williams is also very concerned to remedy the
apparent lack of seriousness of some postmodern versions of social con-
structionism. She turns from metaphors of play to the metaphors of
pragmatism precisely in order to rid her position of the amoral aestheti-
cism that she recognizes as distasteful to many people.'39
Williams' formulation does not, however, address the first difficulty
with social constructionism: the lapse into either relativism or conven-
tionalism. " She has moved the inquiry to a new level-the level of who
we are and want to be rather than what we should do in a specific
instance-but she has not specified the kinds of considerations that
should be relevant or determinative when we attempt to answer those
questions. Again, we are left with nothing to rely on but our culture for
these images of identity; if that culture is consistent, then there is no
room for a critical stance, and if it is inconsistent, there is nothing
beyond it to which we can appeal in order to choose.
In other words, the pragmatic standard of functionality-what
"works"-must itself be filled in by culturally specific concepts. To a
Christian Scientist, prayer works as healing and medicine does not
because the goal is defined in spiritual as well as physical terms. Instru-
mentalism implies an end; the means are assessed by how well they serve
that end. But pragmatism, defined in this methodological way, does not
itself specify the end. It, therefore, may encourage the right kind of
moral responsibility, but can provide no epistemological tools with which
to fulfill it. This type of methodological pragmatism restates, but does
not resolve, the dilemma of social construction.
Other pragmatist feminists have sought to fill this gap by specifying
a normative standard by which to judge various social practices or identi-
ties. By far the most common contender for this position is some version
of an "anti-subordination" principle: a principle requiring us to recognize
and redress imbalances of power and respect, particularly when they fall
138 Williams, supra note 136, at 138.
139 See id. at 132.
140 To be fair, I don't think Williams intends to address this issue. She seems satisfied that cul-
tural standards-the only ones available-are sufficient to make the arguments that concern
her. See id. ("Words were tools even when we thought they were mirrors. The mere admis-
sion that they are no more than tools will not cause them suddenly to break.")
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along the traditional lines of race, gender, and class.14 1 This approach is
the substantive analogue of the more "procedural" attempt to find an
epistemological privilege for the viewpoint of those who are oppressed
and it often accompanies a standpoint epistemology. The attempt explic-
itly to provide such a standard represents the third strategy for dealing
with the problems of social constructionism.
C. An "Independent" Moral Standard
Pragmatists who use a principle like anti-subordination as part of
their approach are relying on a strategy of defining an independent moral
principle with which to choose between norms and perspectives. The
difficulty with such a principle is essentially a problem of description:
what sort of thing is it? If the commitment to anti-subordination is a
transcendent principle, one that applies across cultures and to all con-
texts within cultures, the preeminent moral standard against which prac-
tices and other norms must be judged, then it seems to violate the very
heart and soul of social constructionism. It is not a new epistemology,
but simply a different contender within the old epistemological battles. 142
And it is fundamentally unconnected to the methodology of pragma-
tism.'43 If, on the other hand, anti-subordination is a contextually
derived and contextually bounded norm, then there is no reason to think
that it should apply to every practice we wish to assess, let alone that it
would be the most important norm for every practice. Anti-subordina-
tion would, instead, be one consideration among many, the relevance and
importance of which would have to be judged in particular instances, and
how that judgment would be made is itself extremely unclear. 14
141 See, e.g., Minow & Spelman, supra note 50, at 1632-33, 1650; Radin, supra note 73, at 1711
(describing how attention to the oppressed, including women, can help solve the problem of
"bad coherence"); Matsuda, supra note 116, at 1771-2. This principle is not, however, the
only one that has been suggested. See e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Just do it.- Pragmatism and Pro-
gressive Social Change, 78 VA. L. REV. 697, 699 (1992) ("According to [RICHARD RORTY,
CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1989)] progressive social change is that which
moves a society closer to realizing [Rorty's] three interrelated aspirations: that suffering and
cruelty will be diminished, that freedom will be maximized, and that 'chances for fulfillment of
idiosyncratic fantasies will be equalized.' ") (footnotes omitted).
142 This is the position explicitly taken by Mari Matsuda. See Matsuda, supra note 116, at 1771-
72. Matsuda suggests that we should simply live with the contradiction between the anti-
foundationalism of the pragmatist method, on the one hand, and this foundationalist principle,
on the other. I agree that logical consistency should not be the sine qua non of either an
epistemology or a moral theory, but I am concerned about how that contradiction may play
out in practice. If we do not want to be left with a politics of sheer power, then we must have
some idea about how we can persuade each other. Denying one's interlocutors an intellectual
move that one makes oneself (i.e. foundationalism) while simultaneously offering no argument
for the fundamental principle one is advocating does not seem to me to be likely to advance
the conversation.
143 See Baker, supra note 141. (Rorty's prophetic strand-setting forth his aspirations-is sepa-
rate from his anti-foundationalism).
144 In order to know how to evaluate or choose between norms or perspectives, we need to know
what problem we are dealing with and how far our actual situation is from our ideals, see
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In other words, in order for such a principle to do the work assigned
it, it must neither be totally transcendent nor simply one context-specific
norm among many. It must, that is, escape the Cartesian echo of one
truth or none. The question is, of course, what is left? What else could it
be?145
Katherine Bartlett has explored the nature of such an intermediate
position. t " Bartlett attempts to design an epistemological stance that
will maintain the cultural contingency of the social constructionist argu-
ment while salvaging some basis for truth or objectivity that would allow
for critique. In her approach, called "positionality," truth is always par-
tial, incomplete, and founded on experience rather than unitary and tran-
scendent. 47 Nonetheless, it is possible to improve your knowledge by
attempting to incorporate other perspectives by imaginatively under-
standing the viewpoints of others. t4 Thus, effort, self-discipline, and
self-criticism are essential to knowledge. 49
This combination is extremely useful in staking out a middle
ground. By emphasizing that truth is founded on experience, Bartlett
provides grounds for asserting that it is "real"-"in the sense of pro-
duced by the actual experiences of individuals in their concrete social
relationships"'"°0 -and "valid"-"truth claims are significant or 'valid'
for those who experience that validity.""' We are justified in relying on
such truths as long as we remember that they are provisional and partial.
We can hope to resolve disagreement over such truths only through
struggles over social reality because there is no standard external to expe-
rience to which we can have recourse. 152 But resolution, although never
certain, is possible by reference to internal truths: "internal truths [are
those that] make the most sense of experienced, social existence.""' 3
At two different points, however, an important piece of the argu-
Margaret Jane Radin, Afterward, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1911, 1924 (1990), but we also need to
know how to identify and/or choose those ideals themselves.
145 For a very interesting summary, which characterizes efforts to answer these questions as
"humanitarian jurisprudence," see Lynne Henderson, Whose Nature? Practical Reason and
Patriarchy, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 169, 185-92 (1990).
146 See Bartlett, supra note 78.
147 See id. at 880-81.
148 Id.
149 See id. at 881-82. Interestingly, narrative may be a particularly effective format for facilitating
this effort because it invites the reader into a new perspective founded on experience. See
Patterson, supra note 8, at 313 ("Narrative reconstruction steers a course between the Scylla
of essentialism and the Charybdis of free-wheeling Deconstruction."). For a fascinating dis-
cussion of the epistemological foundations and implications of narrative scholarship, see gener-
ally Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991).
150 Bartlett, supra note 78, at 884. Reality here serves the purpose identified by Sandra Harding
of distinguishing what things are how they appear. See HARDING, supra note 17, at 159-60.
151 Bartlett, supra note 78, at 885.
152 id. at 884.
153 Id.; see also Rhode, supra note 92, at 626 ("To disclaim objective standards of truth is not to
disclaim all value judgments. We need not become positivists to believe that some accounts of
experience are more consistent, coherent, inclusive, self-critical, and so forth.").
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ment is missing. When searching out and imaginatively entering other
perspectives, we are not required to incorporate all viewpoints, but sim-
ply to be open to their challenge.'5 4 This limit is, of course, essential if
positionality is not to degenerate into "a strategy of process and compro-
mise that seeks to reconcile all competing interests."' 155 But if we must
make judgments about which perspectives to incorporate and which not,
then by what standard are we to assess competing viewpoints once we
have tried them on? Similarly, when we struggle collectively over
descriptions of our reality, how are we, as a political community, to
choose between competing and incommensurate-and equally "valid"-
truths? In other words, as a matter of both individual and group deci-
sionmaking, what standards are available from the position of
positionality?
Bartlett has provided a useful sketch of the kind of stance we must
assume when using or seeking our moral principles, but we also need to
know more about what such principles themselves would be like. At
some points, Bartlett seems to suggest that there just are certain values
that we all can and should agree on that might guide at least some of
these choices56 She never provides, however, a clear statement about
the source or precise content of these values. 157  Positionality is an
important part of the solution to the problems of social constructionism,
but it must be supplemented by an account of the sort of standards avail-
able to us.
Many theorists have attempted to define such moral standards; ones
that would not collapse into either transcendence or relativism.' 58 Some
feminists have built on the work of Jurgen Habermas, which draws on a
model of human communication to define methods of and preconditions
for participation which, in turn, provide a foundation for moral and
political judgments.1 59 Others have suggested a model of human flour-
ishing," a traditionally feminine ethic of care, t 6 1 or a post-modem
154 See Bartlett, supra note 78, at 883.
155 Id.
156 See id. at 883-84, n.235.
157 See id. at 884-85 (denying that her position is either essentialist-i.e. relying on a universal
notion of human flourishing-or relativist).
158 For a general endorsement of work on defining these moral standards, see Linda R. Hirsch-
man, The Book of "A ", 70 TEX. L. REV. 971, 990 (1992) ("I hope that by showing the meth-
odological and epistemological similarities between Aristotle's work and contemporary
feminist thought, I have made legitimate an inquiry into the substantive answers about the
human good ...."). For a very interesting attempt to define such a standard from within an
African American critical tradition, see generally Anthony E. Cook, Reflections on
Postmodernism, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 751 (1992).
159 See, e.g., SEYLA BENHABIB, CRITIQUE, NORM, AND UTOPIA 253-79 (1986).
160 See Jagger, supra note 17, at 161; see also GRIMSHAW, supra note 30, at 101 (suggesting a
moral theory based on "interests" to inform epistemology).
161 See generally Joan Tronto, Women and Caring. What Can Feminists Learn About Morality
from Caring?, in GENDER/BODY/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 4, at 172.
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insight of respect for otherness' 62 as possible foundations for ethical and
political values. I will briefly describe two such attempts, building on
very different philosophical traditions, in order to show the type of work
that remains to be done.
Drucilla Cornell, in her recent book Beyond Accommodation: Ethi-
cal Feminism, Deconstruction, and the Law,163 argues that feminist the-
ory should adopt a deconstructionist approach that combines an ethical
commitment to respect for otherness with an affirmation of the continu-
ally transformed and transformative concept of the feminine. Through a
type of feminine writing that constantly challenges and disrupts the
established reality by reinterpreting traditional myths of Woman,' 64 we
can implement the underlying ethical commitment of deconstruction:
bringing in the excluded or suppressed. 16 In this way, we achieve a uto-
pian moment in which the ethical, the "ought," the "not yet of the never
has been,"' 166 generates the "is" of reality rather than the other way
around. 167
Cornell's approach offers several important contributions to the
development of feminist theory, including its emphasis on the impor-
tance of affirming the feminine, its persuasive argument for the usefulness
of a deconstructive approach, and its endorsement of the appealing prin-
ciple of respect for otherness. This approach, however, raises again
(rather than answering) the epistemological questions I have been asking.
What is the source of our creative reinterpretations of the feminine? And
how do we choose between competing reinterpretations? What is the
source and nature of the principle of respect for otherness? Is it a part of
some existing culture (in which case it is an "ought" derived from an "is"
and cannot ground the utopian project) or is it supra-cultural (and how
could anything be supra-cultural in a deconstructionist epistemology in
which " 'there are only contexts, . . . nothing exists outside context
. , 6a)? In other words, the mechanisms through which Cornell
attempts to implement her approach seem to replicate the dilemma
rather than resolve it.' 69
Martha Nussbaum has also recognized and addressed these issues.
She has suggested that an Aristotelian theory of the virtues could be both
162 See Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 291 (1985).
163 DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM, DECONSTRUCTION,
AND THE LAW (1991).
164 See id. at 82-107.
165 See id. at 109-15.
166 Id. at 112.
16 7 See id. at 116-17.
168 Id. at 170 (quoting Derrida).
169 For a much fuller description and assessment of the argument in Cornell's book, see Susan
Williams, Utopianism, Epistemology, and Feminist Theory: A Review of Beyond Accommoda-
tion: Ethical Feminism, Deconstruction, and the Law by Drucilla Cornell, YALE J. L. &
FEMINISM (forthcoming 1993).
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particularist and objective,' 7 threading the middle path between such
dichotomies."7 ' First, she identifies certain areas of life and then defines
virtues as choosing or acting properly in those areas. 72 She acknowl-
edges that the answer to the question "How does one act properly in this
area?" will be highly context specific; indeed, there may be many equally
valid answers for the same virtue in different contexts. But she insists
that "[t]he fact that a good and virtuous decision is context-sensitive does
not imply that it is right only relative to, or inside, a limited context, any
more than the fact that a good navigational judgment is sensitive to par-
ticular weather conditions shows that it is correct only in a local or rela-
tional sense."' 7 3 Nussbaum's position illustrates certain characteristics
that many feminist theories in this category have in common. They seek
to define a middle ground denied by Cartesianism. 74 The principles they
suggest are not transcendent because they are tied to human experience,
subject to constant revision in light of that experience, and susceptible to
real cultural variation. They therefore meet the requirements of social
constructionism. But they are "objective" enough to provide a basis for
some critical bite because they are not simply culturally contingent; they
rely on some regularity in human experience at least over some periods of
time.
There is, of course, no reason to believe that only one substantive
principle will fill this middle ground; it may be that several or even many
principles will serve the purpose of dissolving this dilemma. It is not
necessary that we have some final, determinate method of resolving all
moral or epistemological disagreements.' 75 But it is necessary that we
have some way of narrowing the field of contending positions to a man-
ageable number and that we have some idea of the considerations that
are relevant in arguing about those contenders. The notion of a non-
170 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, 13 MIDWEST
STUD. IN PHIL. 32, 45 (1988).
171 For a very interesting account of the Aristotelian elements of feminist theory, and how these
elements contribute to constructing a middle ground, see Hirschman, supra note 158, at 971-
90.
172 See Nussbaum, supra note 170, at 34-36.
173 Id. at 45. In addition, Nussbaum argues that certain ways of conceptualizing areas of life
represent features of our common humanity, which cross cultural boundaries and define what
it means to be human in so fundamental a way that to change them would be to change the
kind of creatures we understand ourselves to be. As a result, these features may provide a
foundation for standards of virtue that are valid across cultural lines. Such features might
include: our mortality, our dependence on the world outside our bodies for sustenance (physi-
cal and emotional), our cognitive and practical reason functions, and some notion of sociabil-
ity. See id. at 48-49, 50.
174 This is not a middle ground between Cartesianism and social constructionism. It is, instead, a
middle ground between the poles of the various dichotomies within Cartesianism (e.g. objec-
tive/subjective, universal/particular). The dichotomies and Cartesianism itself deny the possi-
bility of such a middle ground. Social constructionism can only help us to escape the
Cartesian trap if it can explain or describe this "excluded middle". It is its failure to do so that
generates the echo of Cartesianism within social constructionist theory.
175 Indeed, one principle or method, one truth, may always involve domination of some people by
others. See Flax, supra note 4, at 48-49.
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Cartesian middle ground could provide such parameters for debate if it
were sufficiently specific.
Such specificity is, however, essential. Without it, it is all too easy to
slip back into the Cartesian trap of reading such a principle as either
unattainably transcendent or uselessly relativistic. To return to Nuss-
baum, for example, her analogy to navigation is an extremely interesting
beginning, but unless it is taken further it too easily degenerates into
another Cartesian echo. It is true that good navigation is not simply
good in context or relationally, but that may be because it is possible to
spell out some general rules about what sorts of considerations ought to
guide good navigation. One cannot know what those rules require in a
given case without looking at the particular context, but it might seem
that one can know what the rules are without looking at the context. For
example, perhaps the rule is that to navigate well one must know in what
direction from one's present location one's destination lies. If this rule is
derivable from Reason, like some Kantian axiom, then it provides a good
basis for distinguishing good and bad navigation regardless of context. A
rule that claimed this sort of Cartesian transcendence would, however, be
subject to a social constructionist argument pointing out that the rule
itself is dependent on context: it only holds when the point of navigation
is to get from one place to another, rather than, for example, to find a
technically challenging course that will fill a certain number of hours. It
presupposes, in other words, a certain social practice in which navigation
plays a part. But if the rule itself is context-dependent, culturally spe-
cific, then it would seem to lose its justification outside of that social
context; it cannot give us the cross-cultural critique that we need. Thus,
the navigation analogy may itself be seen through the lens of the Carte-
sian dichotomy rather than challenging that dichotomy.
This little exercise is not presented as any kind of disproof of Nuss-
baum's or Cornell's arguments; the fact that an approach can be viewed
through a Cartesian lens does not automatically disqualify it. But seeing
how a Cartesian view can force such an approach into a replay of our
epistemological dilemma demonstrates why analogies and generalities are
insufficient. We need to know more about what the middle ground looks
like, how it operates, in order to use it effectively. Nussbaum has
explored this type of judgment in detail in literary and philosophical con-
texts in her other work. 176 We need to continue such exploration in law.
CONCLUSION
Feminism may at last be gaining a toehold in the academy but it is
currently under fire in our society. Issues about how feminists know
176 See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE (1990); MARTHA C. Nuss-
BAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS (1986).
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what we say we know, and how to convince others of what we know
become increasingly urgent as "feminist" threatens to join the list of
political pariah terminology. One of the most pressing questions facing
us is how to justify our claims to those interlocutors we must persuade if
we are to make any meaningful change in our culture or our laws.
Epistemology is not only abstract theory, it is also politics. It is how
we organize political movements that are both inclusive and cohesive;
why we need more women in positions of political and economic power;
how we make people realize the disastrous human consequences of social
policies of oppression or neglect. And epistemology is law as well. It is
how we see the inequality in apparently neutral policies; why we fill court
papers and law review articles with stories of the impact of legal doctrine
on real people; why the gender and race and class of a law professor or a
lawyer or a judge matters.
We live in a world of "fractured horizons," '177 in which we cannot
rely on social reality to generate a set of broad-based, shared meanings
(least of all a feminist meaning). But we must communicate across those
schisms in ways that will persuade those who do not presently see our
reality. It may be neither possible nor desirable for us to view these con-
versations as disagreements that must be settled by reference to some
standard that will generate determinate right answers. But we also can-
not simply accept our different perspectives as an unbridgeable cultural
chasm that leaves us without the possibility of large-scale social change.
Communication requires that we be able to set some boundaries on the
approaches under consideration in any given discussion and that we be
able to say something about what sorts of concerns legitimately motivate
a choice between those approaches. This Article has not attempted to
spell out what those boundaries or concerns should be, but rather to
show how feminist epistemology is presently engaged in this project. I
believe that this work of understanding how conversation and persuasion
can galvanize change is one of the central tasks of a feminist legal
epistemology.
177 CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 14-19, 305-14 (1989).
